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ARTICLES 
THE INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF 
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JONATHAN S. MASUR† & JONATHAN REMY NASH‡ 
Whether and how to provide transition relief from a change in legal regime is a 
question of critical importance. Legislatures and agencies effect changes to the law 
constantly, and affected private actors often seek relief from those changes, at least in 
the short term. Scholarship on transition relief therefore has focused almost entirely on 
examining when transition relief might be justified and now recognizes that there may 
be settings where relief from legal transitions is appropriate. Yet largely absent from 
these treatments is an answer to the question of which institutional actor is best 
positioned to decide when legal transition relief is appropriate and what form it should 
assume. In this Article, we address this issue in two parts: Can the private market 
develop adequate risk-spreading devices such that government relief is unnecessary? If 
government relief is warranted, what government actors are best suited to provide 
relief? We find that private markets will be unable to provide adequate transition 
insurance due to insurmountable pricing difficulties, and that the task must thus fall to 
governmental actors. We then analyze the available governmental actors and conclude 
that, in many cases, an independent agency will be best positioned to make reliable and 
welfare-enhancing decisions regarding transition relief. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this Article, we consider which type of institution should provide 
legal transition relief and analyze the form that it should take. These 
questions are of great importance because the issue of legal transition 
relief—whether and how an institution should compensate parties because 
a change in the law adversely affects them—arises any time a new legal 
regime would render illegal behavior that societal actors previously have 
engaged in legally.1 Relief from the legal transition can assume many 
 
 1 Transition relief, when provided by the government, usually has assumed the form of 
“grandfathering” preexisting behavior or compensating for its discontinuation. See, e.g., Louis 
Kaplow, Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161, 163 
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forms. Transition relief may allow societal actors already engaging in the 
behavior in question to continue to do so (at least to some degree) on a 
going-forward basis—often called “grandfathering.”2 Or, it may offer them 
some form of monetary or other compensation for the loss of that ability. 
Transition relief can benefit—and, conversely, its absence can harm—
producers, consumers, employees, and investors. To mention just two 
contemporary examples, both greenhouse gas regulation (at both the 
domestic and international levels)3 and efforts to rein in executive 
compensation at major financial corporations spark questions of transition 
relief.4 
For many years, the traditional law and economics literature 
advocated strongly against legal transition relief. Led most prominently by 
Louis Kaplow, scholars argued that we should treat legal transitions no 
differently from other types of transitions faced by societal actors.5 Societal 
actors typically receive no aid from the government with respect to changes 
in technology or the economy. Similarly, the argument went, the 
 
(2003) [hereinafter Kaplow, Transition Policy] (“[A] variety of transition provisions can be 
implemented, including partial or full compensation of losses and taxation of gains, 
grandfathering, phase-ins, and so forth.”); cf. Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules 
and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543, 584 (2007) (arguing that “Delay Rules” provide 
partial compensation alternative to generally assumed choice between “just compensation” and 
“no compensation”). This is not always the case, however. On occasion, the government grants a 
firm or industry valuable new rights at the same time that it imposes costly regulation—a type of 
regulatory tradeoff. The Hatch-Waxman Act, which established the modern regulatory regime 
concerning general pharmaceutical drugs, is an example of this type of regime. Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.); see 
also Henry Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and 
Biotechnology Industries, 8 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV., Spring 2003, at 7, 11–14 (describing 
tradeoffs involved in statutory scheme). The arguments that we offer regarding transition relief 
apply equally to all types of government-provided relief, and so, in the Sections that follow, we 
discuss transition relief generally, with occasional references to particular grandfathering regimes 
for purposes of explication. 
 2 See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental 
Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1678 
(2007) (discussing grandfathering of pollution sources under Clean Air Act of 1970). 
 3 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated 
on a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51, 57–65 (2009) (highlighting unique issues associated 
with allocating greenhouse gas emissions permits at international level); Robert N. Stavins, A 
Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System To Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
293, 320–21 (2008) (proposing system that both auctions and grandfathers permits, with 
grandfathering phased out over time). 
 4 See, e.g., Stephen Labaton & Eric Dash, Huge Bonus Hangs over Pay Review, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 13, 2009, at B1 (reporting Citibank’s argument that compensation it owes to trader is 
exempt from federal review on ground that “it is part of a contract signed before the law 
establishing the review system was passed”). 
 5 E.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 
533–36 (1986) [hereinafter Kaplow, Legal Transitions] (asserting that natural disasters and 
government-created risks are analogous); Kaplow, Transition Policy, supra note 1, at 176–77, 
179 (same). 
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government should not offer legal transition relief to private parties.6 
Recent commentary, however, questions the scope of Kaplow’s claim. 
Scholars have pointed out that considerations of efficiency, incentives for 
socially desirable investments, governmental legitimacy, and fairness might 
justify legal transition relief.7 
While these discussions are important, we identify two centrally 
important questions for which scholars have yet to find satisfactory 
answers. First, while societal actors often hedge against transitions in 
technology and the economy by obtaining insurance in the private market, 
such a market does not exist with respect to legal transitions. We consider 
why such an insurance market has failed to develop. Second, commentators 
who advocate transition relief in limited circumstances8 do not confront the 
critical question of what institutional structure is best designed to ensure 
that transition relief is meted out only where justified and in an 
appropriately limited form. 
This Article addresses these shortcomings. First, we undertake a 
careful examination of the potential for a private market for legal transition 
insurance. We conclude that this potential is indeed rather low, but we also 
argue that most of the accepted explanations for the absence of such a 
market are not plausible. The major impediment to a private market for 
legal transition insurance is the chore of pricing. While this conclusion 
ultimately supports the view that a private insurance market is unlikely to 
arise in the short term, it also suggests that a functioning market is not the 
pipe dream that many have thought it to be. It is conceivable that 
 
 6 Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 5, at 528–31. 
 7 See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An 
Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 582–99 (1984) (contending absence of private 
insurance against government action may necessitate compensation for government takings in 
order to minimize suboptimally low investments); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic 
Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1138–43 
(1996) (arguing that without transition relief, tax incentives may become more expensive to 
government); Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1025, 1041–47 (2007) (asserting transition relief may be appropriate to 
induce actors to undertake socially desirable voluntary projects); Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation 
and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to Environmental Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 
831, 833–34 (2009) [hereinafter Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty] (arguing that transition relief 
occasionally may enhance government legitimacy); Nash & Revesz, supra note 2, at 1727–28, 
1730–32 (noting that limited transition relief might be justified on grounds of investment 
efficiency and fairness); Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and 
Grandfathering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 44–50 (2008) (advocating transition relief where social 
costs of transition relief’s absence outweigh social costs of transition relief); cf. Saul Levmore, 
Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657, 1665–66 (1999) (describing 
transition relief as way to compensate politically powerful interests who otherwise would stand to 
lose under, and therefore would oppose, new legal regime). 
 8 See, e.g., Nash & Revesz, supra note 2, at 1727–28 (advocating limiting transition relief to 
actors who invest in advanced control technology ahead of legal requirements). 
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information and derivative markets might facilitate pricing for insurers. In 
the end, however, we remain doubtful that information markets robust 
enough to sustain a functioning private insurance market can arise. 
Concluding that the likelihood of an imminent private market solution 
to the problem of legal transitions is low, we turn to the question of which 
institutional structure is best suited to governmental provision of transition 
relief. The key to our solution is the disaggregation of transition relief into 
various steps and the allocation of individual duties based on institutional 
competency. Specifically, we argue that there are many circumstances in 
which we might appropriately leave the general decision whether to allow 
for any transition relief to the legislature, while an independent agency 
might best make decisions as to the form of transition relief and its 
allocation among competing claimants. This solution maintains legislative 
input on questions related to legitimacy and fairness while diminishing the 
opportunity of some actors to seek rents via political lobbying.9 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the 
existing literature. It discusses the prior general law and economics 
proscription against legal transition relief and then canvasses various 
commentators’ justifications for limited legal transition relief. We hasten to 
note that in describing the potential welfare benefits of transition relief we 
rely entirely on this prior work. We premise our argument on the notion 
that in certain circumstances transition relief can be beneficial, and we do 
not intend to reargue that point here. Part II examines the absence of a 
private market in insurance against the risks of legal transitions and finds 
pricing to be the largest impediment. Part III analyzes whether information 
and derivatives markets could aid in solving these pricing problems, and it 
concludes that such markets are unlikely to be of sufficient help. Finally, 
having concluded that no private market for regulatory insurance is likely 
to develop, we turn our attention in Part IV to the question of which 
institutions might be best situated to decide whether and how to issue 
transition relief. We argue that an independent agency should play a larger 
role in providing transition relief. In particular, such an agency should have 
a say as to the form of transition relief and should generally handle its 
allocation. 
 
 9 We note at the outset that we are not concerned here with every conceivable type of 
regulation that a legislature or agency might implement. Our focus is on economic regulations of 
all types—environmental protections, workplace safety laws, food quality regulations, etc. We 
place to the side all strictly “social” regulation, such as rules regarding marriage or abortion. 
Issues stemming from California’s recent prohibition on same-sex marriage after its prior 
legalization, for instance, are beyond the scope of this Article. While we recognize that the line 
between these two categories may not be entirely clean or precise, we will generally focus on 
only those types of regulations that money alone can compensate. 
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I 
THE TRADITIONAL LAW AND ECONOMICS VIEW OF LEGAL TRANSITION RELIEF 
In this Part, we present the existing law and economics literature on 
relief from legal transitions. First, we describe the general proscription 
against such relief as expounded by Louis Kaplow. Second, we discuss the 
growing recognition that transition relief can be socially beneficial in 
particular circumstances. Third, we survey the basic arguments for and 
against private and public providers of transition relief. We wish to 
emphasize that we intend to break no new ground in describing the 
arguments favoring transition relief in limited circumstances. We rely 
entirely on the arguments that exist in the literature, which we find largely 
persuasive. 
A. The Standard Treatment of Transition Relief 
The seminal treatment of transition relief is Louis Kaplow’s 1986 
article on the subject.10 In that article, Kaplow argued that relief from legal 
transitions was essentially never justified on a welfare basis. He grounded 
his argument on an analogy between legal regime changes and other types 
of changes that actors in society may face, such as economic and 
technological transitions and changes to health status.11 The government 
does not ordinarily provide relief to actors that suffer as a result of 
economic or technological change and, Kaplow argued, the government 
should treat legal regime transitions no differently from economic and 
technological changes.12 
Indeed, classical law and economics approaches imply that transition 
relief can be socially unproductive. The absence of government-provided 
relief encourages societal actors to act efficiently and to plan in anticipation 
of possible economic and technological changes.13 Were the government to 
provide legal regime transition relief, societal actors might be discouraged 
from anticipating looming changes in the law. Because efficiency 
considerations suggest that the law should encourage societal actors to 
anticipate such changes, Kaplow concluded that legal regime transition 
relief is generally normatively undesirable.14 
 
 10 Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 5. 
 11 Id. at 533–36; see also DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 27–32 (2000) (discussing 
incentive effects on societal actors of ex ante likely direction of rule change). 
 12 E.g., Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 5, at 533–36. 
 13 Id. at 528–31. 
 14 Id. With respect to policy-based changes in the law, Daniel Shaviro argues that it might be 
optimal both to compensate those who stand to lose under a new legal regime and also to seek 
compensation from those who stand to gain. SHAVIRO, supra note 11, at 99–100. He recognizes, 
however, that the political reality is that those who stand to lose are much more likely to obtain 
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At the outset, it is important to note that Kaplow’s argument depends 
to some extent on the availability of private insurance for legal transitions.15 
One way that societal actors can anticipate and guard against the risks of 
economic and social transitions is to purchase insurance against those risks; 
Kaplow anticipates that societal actors should also be free to guard against 
the risks of legal transitions by purchasing insurance against those risks.16 
Yet, on this score, the analogy between social or economic changes and 
legal transitions falls short: While as a general matter markets exist for 
private insurance against economic downturns,17 similar markets do not 
exist for private insurance against legal transitions.18 
This dissimilarity poses a significant puzzle: Why have private 
insurance markets for legal transitions failed to arise? We take up this 
question, as well as the subsidiary issue of whether government might be 
able to foster the growth of such a market,19 in Part II. In addition, the 
absence of private insurance provides a first justification for some type of 
government-supplied transition relief. The fact that private insurance is 
often available as a hedge against economic change, but not against legal 
change, suggests that government-provided transition relief should, if 
anything, be more common in the setting of legal transitions.20 
B. Carveouts to the General Proscription: The Argument for Transition 
Relief 
The absence of private insurance aside, a number of commentators 
working within the basic logic of Kaplow’s argument have advanced 
 
compensation than are those who stand to gain likely to be compelled to surrender it. Id. at 100–
01. Given this asymmetry, he concludes that the better norm is to deny transition relief across the 
board. Id. at 101. For a discussion of Shaviro’s view with respect to non-policy-based legal 
changes, see infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 15 See Kaplow, Transition Policy, supra note 1, at 178–86 (predicting greater efficiency from 
private insurance scheme than from transition relief). 
 16 See, e.g., Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 5, at 527–28 (“Insurance is one of the 
more common techniques for mitigating risk . . . .”). 
 17 In addition to private insurance, some actors are able to hedge against future economic 
change using futures contracts. See, e.g., Eric J. Pan, Single Stock Futures and Cross-border 
Access for U.S. Investors, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 221, 239 (2008) (“Futures contracts are used 
to lock in the price of assets in the future to protect the investor from adverse changes in the spot 
market price of the asset.”). 
 18 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 7, at 592–97 (explaining absence of private insurance 
markets against legal change). 
 19 See Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 5, at 545 n.99 (noting possibility of government 
support of private insurance). 
 20 This is not to suggest that, normatively, the absence of an insurance market should mandate 
transition relief. We mean only to suggest that the analogy between the settings is not so clear, 
and also that, as a positive matter, transition relief might be more common than government 
mitigation of natural social and economic change given the absence of a private insurance market 
for regulatory change. 
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theories of limited situations in which legal transition relief might be 
justified. We group these arguments into five broad categories: (1) 
concerns of efficiency; (2) promotion of socially productive investment; (3) 
political necessity; (4) enhancement of governmental legitimacy; and (5) 
concerns of fairness. We canvass these in turn. 
First, transition relief may be necessary to further efficiency. Steven 
Shavell has explained broadly that there are circumstances where the social 
costs of the absence of transition relief outweigh the social costs of 
transition relief itself.21 Where investments for compliance are durable, the 
costs that a firm faces to comply with a new legal rule immediately upon its 
enactment—by, for example, retrofitting its factory—may far outweigh the 
marginal benefit gained.22 Shavell also argues that the costs of 
administering transition relief may justify delaying legal transitions: Where 
legal change is inefficient without transition relief, and where the costs of 
distinguishing between those who should enjoy relief and those who should 
not outweigh the benefits of offering any relief at all, the change should be 
delayed until it becomes efficient with no transition relief.23 
Second, policymakers may harness transition relief to encourage 
socially productive investment. There are several ways that this investment 
may manifest itself. We have each separately advanced arguments along 
these lines,24 as have Kyle Logue25 and Lawrence Blume and Daniel 
Rubinfeld.26 
Masur has explained that the availability of transition relief may 
induce actors to undertake voluntary projects. Consider that some societal 
actors may decide whether to undertake a project or investment depending 
upon whether they can expect the government to stand by the current legal 
regime.27 On this basis, avenues should be available for government 
agencies to commit to the status quo on at least a limited basis.28 The 
decision to do this should lie with the relevant government agency; 
 
 21 Shavell, supra note 7, at 38. 
 22 Id. at 38–39. 
 23 Id. at 39. 
 24 See Masur, supra note 7, at 1041–47 (arguing that vulnerability to legal transitions may 
discourage investment); Nash & Revesz, supra note 2, at 1727–28 (noting that limited transition 
relief might be justified on grounds of investment efficiency). 
 25 See Logue, supra note 7, at 1138–43 (arguing that without transition relief, tax incentives 
may become more expensive to government). 
 26 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 7, at 582–99 (contending that absence of private 
insurance against government action may necessitate compensation for government takings in 
order to minimize suboptimally low investments). 
 27 Masur, supra note 7, at 1041–47. 
 28 Id. at 1025; see also Christopher Serkin, Entrenching Environmentalism: Private 
Conservation Easements over Public Land, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474288 (arguing that legislative entrenchment of preexisting private 
law might be proper in some circumstances, but only if appropriately limited). 
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presumably, an agency would opt to commit only to the extent that the 
societal benefits of such commitment outweighed its costs. 
Nash and Richard Revesz have explained that efficiency may justify 
grandfathering existing investments for some reasonable time period in 
compliance with an old environmental legal regime: 
One might argue that the incentive to anticipate legal change can be 
excessive in some cases. For example, an actor who foresees a change in 
technology and installs that technology might find that technology was 
about to advance again. Depending upon the cost of replacing old 
equipment with new and the rate at which technology is advancing, 
plant owners might rationally decide that it is too costly to comply with 
all technological changes, even ones that they anticipate. 
To remedy this situation, grandfathering may be desirable where 
precautionary investments are “durable” for some period of time, and 
especially where the cost of including pollution control technology in 
new plants is far less than the cost of installing such technology in 
existing plants.29 
Along similar lines, the large expenses generally associated with 
environmental regulatory compliance might discourage actors from 
voluntarily complying with impending regulation absent some assurance 
that a subsequent tightening of the regulatory standard would not soon 
render that investment obsolete. Once again, transition relief would be 
normatively desirable to the extent that it fostered the sizeable investments 
necessary to comply with existing legal regulation. Thus, for example, 
time-limited transition relief might be necessary in some situations to 
encourage welfare-enhancing investments.30 
Logue has argued that transition relief may protect the law’s ability to 
influence behavior. For example, Congress has at times attempted to alter 
taxpayers’ behavior using the tax code.31 For such so-called “incentive 
subsidies” to be effective, either taxpayers must be able to rely on the 
government’s commitment to retain those incentives or the government 
must offer greater subsidies to produce the same effect.32 Blume and 
Rubinfeld focus on compensation for takings33 as an example of transition 
relief that encourages owners to undertake investments with respect to their 
property. They explain that the absence of private insurance against 
government action may necessitate compensation for government takings 
 
 29 Nash & Revesz, supra note 2, at 1727–28 (footnotes omitted). 
 30 Id.; cf. Masur, supra note 7, at 1043 (noting that actors may avoid investments in absence 
of commitment to regulatory stability). 
 31 Logue, supra note 7, at 1138–39. 
 32 Id. at 1139. 
 33 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting taking of private property “for public 
use, without just compensation”). 
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in order to minimize suboptimal investments.34 
A third justification for transition relief may stem from political 
necessity. Under Saul Levmore’s reasoning, Kaplow’s description of the 
nature of legal regime change paints a false choice.35 Kaplow assumes that 
there can be a state of the world under a new legal regime without 
transition relief—call this state of the world N—and that state N is 
preferable to the status quo (state S). But it may be that state N is not 
attainable: Those who stand to lose in the transition from S to N may have 
enough political power to block that transition. They may demand and 
extract transition relief in exchange for allowing the new legal regime to be 
enacted. If that is true, then state N may not be a viable, attainable choice. 
Even if state N would be preferable to a state of the world where the new 
legal regime obtains but transition relief has been granted (call this state 
N’), the actual choice lies not between state S and state N, but rather 
between state S and state N’. If that is so, transition relief is normatively 
desirable so long as state N’ is preferable to state S because transition relief 
will facilitate the attainment of this new legal regime. Without transition 
relief, the status quo S will remain entrenched.36 
Fourth, as Nash has explained elsewhere, the goal of maintaining 
governmental legitimacy may justify transition relief.37 The absence of 
transition relief may generate externalities and impose costs on parties not 
directly affected by the transition.38 Social norms may also dictate some 
transition relief.39 
Fairness concerns provide a fifth and final possible justification for 
transition relief: 
[O]ne can argue that it is unfair to require actors who have invested in 
an upgrade before a new regulation takes effect to once again undertake 
costly compliance with a new standard. Thus, like considerations 
involving incentive effects, concerns of fairness may justify extending 
protection to societal actors who invest before a regulation takes effect 
for some reasonable period of time.40 
It may also be unfair to deny transition relief to a party that truly could 
not have anticipated the legal change. Logue notes that not all of the 
arguments for withholding transition relief from corporations apply with 
respect to individuals, implying that unsophisticated parties should receive 
 
 34 Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 7, at 582–99. 
 35 Levmore, supra note 7, at 1665–66. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty, supra note 7, at 831, 833–34. 
 38 Id. at 834 (suggesting that avoidance of externalities justified government relief to financial 
sector in recent economic crisis). 
 39 Id. (arguing that transition relief may be justified “to protect lifestyles and community 
cohesion”). 
 40 Nash & Revesz, supra note 2, at 1730–31 (footnote omitted). 
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relief more regularly than sophisticated ones.41 Daniel Shaviro makes a 
similar argument about non-policy-based legal changes, such as changes to 
the accounting rules under the tax laws. Insofar as these types of changes 
have less valence, they are more in the nature of housekeeping and much 
less predictable. Accordingly, we should be more likely to afford transition 
relief with respect to them.42 
These justifications for transition relief fall into three general 
categories: justifications based on the notion that transition relief is 
economically beneficial on its own merits (rationales 1 and 2); a 
justification based on the idea that the new, superior legal regime is 
unattainable without the provision of transition relief (rationale 3); and 
justifications based on fairness or legitimacy (rationales 4 and 5). For ease 
of explication we will refer to the first category as the “economic” 
rationales for transition relief, the second category as the “political” 
rationale, and the third category as the “legitimacy” rationales. The 
distinctions among these three categories will be significant to the analysis 
in Part IV. 
We believe that these scholars have successfully established the 
desirability of transition relief, at least in particular circumstances. For the 
balance of this Article, we put aside the question of whether transition 
relief is ever justified, treating it as a premise of our inquiry. That is not to 
say, of course, that it should become the norm in legal regime shifts. 
Transition relief will, we hope, remain quite rare. The question that remains 
is who should provide that relief when it is warranted. 
C. Private and Public Provision of Transition Relief 
The commentators who argue for government-provided legal 
transition relief generally assume that private insurance will not be 
available to fill the gap left in the absence of such relief.43 Were private 
insurance available, it might help to address many of the identified 
problems. A market for private insurance against legal transitions 
presumably would provide assurance for continued investments in the face 
of legal uncertainty without actually requiring legal transition relief.44 The 
 
 41 See Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Legal Progress, 13 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 213 (2003) (noting that “competitive, evolutionary pressures” that 
make corporations likely to anticipate risks do not apply to individuals). 
 42 SHAVIRO, supra note 11, at 101–03. 
 43 See, e.g., Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 7, at 572 (“Although one might expect investors 
to avoid the costs associated with risk by obtaining insurance in the private market, such 
insurance is not available because of market failure.”). 
 44 Investors might well prefer that publicly owned and traded companies operate neutrally 
with respect to risk. An investor can hedge risk on her own simply by assembling a diverse 
portfolio of assets. In reality, of course, agency costs within firms often lead them to behave in 
risk-averse fashion. Executives seeking to protect their jobs will avoid risky behavior, even at the 
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availability of insurance might also ameliorate the political argument for 
legal transition relief: If the putative losers under a new legal regime would 
have their losses covered by private insurance, those parties would have 
reduced incentives to obstruct the new legal regime.45 It might also mitigate 
fairness concerns.46 The availability of private insurance, however, would 
not be a panacea. It would only lessen the concerns described above, not 
eliminate them, because the “recipients” of transition relief would be forced 
to pay for it to some degree through insurance premiums. It would also do 
little to cure inefficiencies related to transition costs (rationale 1) or 
shortfalls in governmental legitimacy (rationale 5). 
At the same time, private insurance seems quite attractive when 
compared with the governmental alternative, at least on its face. A private 
insurance market would likely be superior to the government at assembling 
the information and processes necessary to arrive at the optimal level of 
transition relief—that is, the level at which the marginal benefit of 
additional transition relief equals its cost.47 To be sure, a government actor 
may in many cases be better able to anticipate what regulations the 
government is on the verge of issuing. This will not always be true, 
however. Individual government actors may not be aware of what other 
governmental actors want or plan. Profit may also motivate private 
insurance companies to gather and aggregate that information, even if it is 
 
expense of lower expected net returns. See William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt 
Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 128 n.163 
(describing management’s risk aversion due to its “undiversifiable investment in human capital”); 
Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE 
L.J. 857, 864 (1984) (noting that market pressures are unlikely to overcome top management’s 
aversion to risk). This risk-averse behavior makes regulatory (or other) insurance potentially 
socially valuable even for publicly traded firms with diversified owners, which otherwise might 
manage risk effectively on their own. 
  There may also be some risks small enough to allow large firms to self-insure (i.e., absorb 
the risk and count on the firm’s large size to protect it against significant shocks). However, for 
smaller firms most regulatory risks will be too large to permit self-insurance; and some regulatory 
events—major carbon taxes, for instance—may be so significant that even large firms cannot 
self-insure. There are thus many contexts in which self-interested firm executives would pursue 
outside insurance. 
 45 See Kaplow, Transition Policy, supra note 1, at 197–98 (noting that compensation for 
preexisting interests may reduce or eliminate resistance of those who otherwise would stand to 
lose under new legal regime and that “private insurance may also produce a similar effect”). 
 46 If parties did not know in advance whether they would be winners or losers under a new 
legal regime, they would all elect to insure, leaving them in similar positions once the new regime 
was implemented. But see William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and 
Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 269, 282–83 (1988) (discussing how insurance against takings would not cover 
demoralization costs—that is, negative feelings about government that result from exercise of 
eminent domain). 
 47 Cf. Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 313, 340 (2006) (describing “optimal level of pollution” analogously). 
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not as immediately available to them. 
Even if government actors are better positioned to know what 
government regulations are impending, they are not as well positioned to 
assess how those regulations might impact prospective regulated entities.48 
In this regard, government lacks the information and incentives to select 
the optimal level of relief.49 Suboptimal choices in setting the amount of 
relief—whether too little or too much—will lead to distortions in behavior 
and ultimately to inefficient outcomes. In contrast, a private insurance 
market is designed to respond to price signals and thus is likely to arrive at 
close to that optimal level (although it will not succeed when social 
benefits and costs differ from private benefits and costs).50 
Leaving aside informational shortcomings, a second problem of 
government provision of transition relief involves the government’s 
likelihood of falling prey to those who seek transition relief and 
consequently meting out too much relief. Government is susceptible to 
interest group pressure from potential recipients, and transition relief will 
likely be valuable enough to spur societal actors to apply pressure. 
 
 48 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in 
Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1413–15 (2008) (detailing information deficits 
faced by government agencies in evaluating environmental regulatory decisions). 
 49 Cf. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. 
REV. 1333, 1342–43 (1985) (arguing that implementation of marketable pollution emission 
allowance scheme in place of environmental command-and-control regulation “would 
immediately eliminate most of the information-processing tasks that are presently overwhelming 
the federal and state bureaucracies” and “[i]nstead of giving the job of economic and 
technological assessment to bureaucrats, . . . would put the information-processing burden 
precisely where it belongs: upon business managers and engineers who are in the best position to 
figure out how to cut back on their plants’ pollution costs”). 
Some commentators laud the notion of Congress setting the level of pollution under a cap-
and-trade regime. See, e.g., id. at 1353 (noting regime’s advantages over command-and-control 
policies); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 636 [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Administrative Substance] (observing that one benefit of cap-and-trade system as 
compared to command-and-control regulation is that cap-and-trade systems put political and 
public focus on how much pollution will be allowed); Cass R. Sunstein, Democratizing America 
Through Law, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 949, 967 (1991) [hereinafter Sunstein, Democratizing 
America] (same). This argument is made, however, in the context of “democratizing” the 
development of environmental law by focusing attention on an issue that the public can easily 
digest, not on the idea that in fact government is by design more likely than a private market to 
arrive at an “optimal” level of pollution. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict 
Between Tradable Pollution Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 465, 525 n.224 (2000) (noting possibility that democratically determined pollution cap 
might differ from optimal level of pollution). 
 50 See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort 
Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 
106–07 (1993) (discussing differences between social insurance and private insurance in context 
of tort reform); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 
277, 309 (2001) (describing how private insurance would not be perfect substitute for takings 
liability because it does not cover demoralization costs suffered by society when government 
takes property). 
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Transition relief is a likely subject of lobbying: “The clearer it is who the 
winners and losers will be, the more intense the lobbying and the greater 
danger of legislation emerging that caters to the interests of powerful 
incumbents.”51 A captured governmental body will not generate transition 
relief that is socially desirable; rather, it will deliver relief to the actors who 
have “captured” the agency.52 And even if the government is not fully 
captured by special interests, it will still be subject to lobbying by those 
interest groups.53 
In addition, as Levmore notes, the possible advent of a new legal 
regime offers a particularly powerful opportunity for special interest groups 
with political power to threaten to block the enactment of the new regime.54 
Those groups may agree to allow the new regime to become law only upon 
securing transition relief.55 Interest groups and politicians on the other side 
who highly value enactment of the new regime may be happy (under the 
circumstances) to make this trade.56 In this sense, transition relief may be a 
goal often achievable through capture, lobbying, and barter, rather than on 
the basis of pure social welfare. 
The weaknesses inherent in governmental provision of transition relief 
make market-based alternatives attractive. Yet no private market for 
transition relief has come into existence, and none is on the horizon. In the 
Part that follows, we explore and explain this puzzling lacuna. 
II 
THE PRIVATE MARKET’S FAILURE 
Regulated firms now confront a challenging landscape. On the one 
hand, there is a widely felt need for some type of transition relief, a need 
 
 51 Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 42 (2008). 
 52 For a review of capture theory, see Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized 
Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284–92 (2006). 
 53 See Bradford C. Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
34, 49 (1993) (arguing that “agency capture is a continuum” on which outside influence may not 
rise to level of total capture). Moreover, the success of interest groups at attaining transition relief 
at one stage may serve to fuel demands for additional transition relief—including extensions of 
earlier relief—at later stages. As Nash and Revesz explain: “Transition relief . . . generally gives 
rise to . . . an incentive for existing actors to try to preserve and extend transition relief so they 
can continue to extract the economic rents it creates.” Nash & Revesz, supra note 2, at 1729. 
Thus, lobbying begets transition relief, which may in turn beget more lobbying later for even 
more (or extensions of) transition relief. 
 54 Levmore, supra note 7, at 1665. 
 55 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 44–54 
(1981) (describing how polluting sources in eastern United States secured amendment of clean air 
legislation to limit ability of western states, where air was relatively cleaner, to attract prospective 
competitors through promise of less stringent air quality controls). 
 56 Levmore, supra note 7, at 1665–66. 
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buttressed by sound economic theory. At the same time, government-
provided relief—in the form of grandfathering—is widely opposed on the 
grounds that government will do a poor job of rationing the supply, both 
because of rent-seeking political activity and because government cannot 
accurately assess the market. The obvious remedy is a private market for 
regulatory insurance, and several commentators have suggested such a 
solution.57 Yet no market has ever developed, for reasons no one has been 
able to explain adequately. In this Part, we attempt an explanation for this 
glaring market failure, and we propose a variety of measures that Congress 
might take to facilitate the development of private regulatory insurance. 
A. The Need for Insurance 
As the foregoing Part made clear, the possibility of state or federal 
regulation presents a set of business risks akin to the risk of loss from a fire 
or flood. Businesses will rationally wish to guard against many of these 
risks, and from the standpoint of overall social welfare, it will make sense 
in a variety of cases to allow businesses some protection against the costs 
and uncertainty that these regulatory transitions might create. Government-
provided grandfathering is the traditional solution to such problems, but 
there are many reasons—political, market-related, and information-
driven—to believe that government is a particularly ineffective purveyor of 
such relief.58 Indeed, it is unlikely that government will succeed in 
allocating grandfathered relief in anything approaching an efficient manner. 
Under these circumstances, the most evident solution would appear to 
be a private market for regulatory insurance. Firms would not be spared the 
costs of regulatory transitions, but they would be able to amortize those 
costs and deflect the risk and uncertainty associated with changes in the 
regulatory landscape. Regulated firms would then be able to make greater 
investments in new technologies and new lines of business without fear of 
unpredictable legal developments wiping them out. This loosening of firm 
behavior would likely have salutary overall effects on social welfare.59 It is 
 
 57 E.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 50, at 307–10; Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 7, at 
590–92; Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should “Just Compensation” Be 
Abolished, and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 513–16 
(2003); Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 5, at 537–41; Shavell, supra note 7, at 78. 
 58 See supra Part I.C. 
 59 Our claim that a functioning market for private regulatory insurance would enhance social 
welfare is based upon the arguments of numerous other scholars detailed in Part I. We do not 
intend to break any new ground on this question here. Nonetheless, we pause to address briefly 
one commonly raised objection to transition relief, namely, that it will disincentivize firms from 
adapting to new rules in socially beneficial ways. 
Were it to exist, private regulatory insurance would be unlikely to generate this unwelcome 
effect so long as insurance contracts were structured properly. As we describe below in the 
subsection on moral hazard, these contracts should be written to provide fixed payouts in the 
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not surprising, then, that several commentators have suggested the value of 
a private market for regulatory insurance and transition relief. Indeed, 
while some have merely pointed to the obvious market need,60 others 
appear to assume that such a market either already exists or will soon 
spring forth into being.61 
Yet that has not taken place. There exists no meaningful market for 
regulatory insurance in the United States, and not even a market for 
insurance against government takings (which would appear to be a much 
simpler endeavor).62 This is not to say that there is an underdeveloped 
 
event of regulation, not unlimited liability based upon an insured’s actual losses. See infra Part 
II.B.1.a. Consider, for instance, the effect of a carbon tax on the American automobile industry. A 
carbon tax will make SUVs more expensive relative to smaller, more fuel-efficient cars. 
Consumers will accordingly shift some consumption to those smaller cars, and automotive 
companies will adjust production towards those types of vehicles as well. 
This shift will occur irrespective of whether the industry is insured against carbon 
regulation: So long as insurance contracts are written to provide fixed payments in the event of 
regulation, insurance will not change firms’ incentives at the margin. The firm will collect the 
fixed insurance payout regardless of what action it takes in response to the regulation. The firm 
will then make the same competitive decision it would have made absent insurance; it has no 
reason to adjust its behavior. Thus, the presence of insurance will not significantly dissuade firms 
from anticipating legal change, which is sometimes required as a matter of efficiency. See 
Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. 
PA. L. REV. 47, 65–66 (1977) (explaining that it is often efficiency enhancing when private 
parties anticipate legal change); Levmore, supra note 7, at 1663 (same). 
Insurance might have some effect on industries’ incentives to anticipate legal change. But 
even this will be a second-order effect. Again, insurance would not disincentivize firms from 
taking into consideration the possibility of future regulation at the margin; it would only affect the 
risk profile of the various options available to the firm. Thus, even if regulation is endogenous to 
firm behavior—e.g., the more that automobile manufacturers switch to fuel-efficient cars, the 
more likely it is that the government will impose a carbon tax—the availability of insurance 
would not significantly alter the probability of legal change. The principal effects of insurance 
would be to cushion the industry against the costs of switching production and possibly to 
disincentivize the industry from lobbying against regulatory change. See infra Part II.B.1.b 
(describing effect of regulatory insurance on industry lobbying). It is thus conceivable that the 
availability of insurance would have salutary effects on the rate of legal change. Cf. Levmore, 
supra note 7, at 1668–74 (describing ways in which transition relief can encourage legal change 
by mitigating losses of losers in new regime, but arguing such benefits are outweighed by risk of 
rent-seeking). 
Automobile firms would be disincentivized from altering their behavior only if they were 
insured based on actual lost profits. In this circumstance, insured firms would have little or no 
incentive to mitigate the harm to their businesses caused by regulation—in fact, they might as 
well shut down. This presents a typical case of moral hazard, a threat that we believe can be dealt 
with by contract. We discuss the contractual solution to this problem infra Part II.B.1. 
 60 See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 7, at 78; David A. Dana, Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy 
Research, Reforming Section 10 and the Habitat Conservation Program 27 (Sept. 15, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University Law Review), available at 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/Dana.pdf. 
 61 See, e.g., Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 5, at 537–41 (taking existence of private 
market insurance for granted in discussing moral hazard problem).  
 62 It is noteworthy that a robust market exists for insurance against foreign government 
expropriation of American firms’ assets abroad. See Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global 
520-307-JM-RELIEF'.DOC 4/28/2010  3:45 PM 
May 2010] INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF TRANSITION RELIEF  117 
 
market for such insurance, or that firms are forced to pay exorbitant rates 
and often have difficulty finding coverage; to the contrary, the market 
simply does not exist. Firms that wish to guard against large governmental 
changes that affect their businesses must either self-insure or invest in 
lobbying as a palliative; there are no other options. 
B. Market Explanations for the Insurance Gap 
Given the obvious demand for some type of regulatory insurance to 
supplement (or displace) government-provided transition relief, the 
complete absence of any market solution is puzzling. Scholars have made 
various attempts to explain this gap in the market—though mostly in the 
context of takings, and more rarely with respect to general administrative 
regulation—and they have pinned the blame on a variety of the usual 
economic culprits. In this Section, we review these possibilities and 
ultimately conclude that none of the typical explanations offers a plausible 
solution to this puzzle, at least when it comes to health and safety 
regulations. Instead, we argue that the market’s failure to provide any type 
of private insurance is attributable to the difficulty of pricing what are 
effectively one-off “democratic” transactions. 
1. Moral Hazard 
Insurance against economic regulation poses two types of potential 
moral hazard problems. First, an insured firm might engage in “internal” 
activities that heighten its exposure to risk. A firm might fail to develop 
new product lines or ways of doing business as hedges against changes in 
the regulatory environment—the equivalent of failing to take useful 
precautions—or it might recklessly expand its business in such a way as to 
heighten damages in the event of a regulatory change. Second, the firm 
might engage in “external” activities—namely, lobbying—that heighten the 
 
Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an 
International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 111–14 (2003) (describing 
market). Yet even this insurance covers only genuine seizure of property, not standard regulation. 
The policies written by the two major providers are illustrative. The Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency insures only against 
[a]ny legislative action or administrative action or omission attributable to the host 
government which has the effect of depriving the holder of a guarantee of his 
ownership or control of, or a substantial benefit from, his investment, with the exception 
of non-discriminatory measures of general application which governments normally 
take for the purpose of regulating economic activity in their territories. 
Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency art. 11(a), Oct. 11, 1985, 
T.I.A.S. No. 12,089, 1508 U.N.T.S. 99 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) insures policyholders only against “total expropriation” in 
violation of international or local laws, not standard legal regulation. See Been & Beauvais, 
supra, at 112–13 & n.383 (citing variety of OPIC documents and discussing possible limits of 
coverage, including regulatory expropriations). 
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likelihood of regulation. We consider these possibilities in turn. 
a. Internal Activities 
Much like an individual with full medical coverage who chooses to 
engage in risky and dangerous activities without adequate precautions, a 
firm that has procured insurance against a particular type of regulatory risk 
might ignore possible mechanisms for diminishing its exposure. For 
instance, a firm whose business relies on a particular hazardous chemical 
might fail to explore alternatives if it has insured against the risk of the 
government banning that chemical. These types of moral hazards have 
typically shouldered the blame for the failures of a variety of insurance 
markets, including insurance against takings and regulation.63 
Yet the potential moral hazard in regulatory settings is not so easy to 
pinpoint. Moral hazard problems exist when an insured party engages in 
behavior—particularly as a consequence of purchasing insurance—that the 
insurer has not priced into the contract.64 The extreme skier who buys 
specially targeted health insurance is already paying an additional premium 
for the increased risk that attends his sport; there is no moral hazard. It is 
the mild-mannered law professor who decides to take up extreme skiing 
because of his newly-purchased gold-plated insurance who exploits a moral 
hazard. Similarly, in the case of a home insurance policy against fire 
damage, the moral hazard arises from the fact that the policy includes 
provisions requiring the homeowner to install fire alarms, avoid space 
heaters, and so forth.65 If the policy is priced to reflect the assumption that 
the homeowner will take these steps, and if it is costly for the insurance 
company to monitor whether the homeowner has complied (either before 
the fact or after an accident has occurred), there is a substantial threat that 
 
 63 See, e.g., Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 7, at 593–95 (discussing complete lack of 
competitive insurance markets for regulatory and physical takings); Calandrillo, supra note 57, at 
513–14 (arguing that subjective valuations of real property by owners pose problems for market 
value–based compensation); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Unbundling Risk 34–36 (Jan. 31, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University Law Review) (blaming failure of 
markets to emerge in part on inability to separate insurable risks from those under individual’s 
control); cf. Robert G. Chambers, Insurability and Moral Hazard in Agricultural Insurance 
Markets, 71 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 604, 604 (1989) (noting that moral hazard is one of foremost 
obstacles to establishing private agricultural insurance markets). 
 64 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 
AM. ECON. REV. 941, 961 (1963) (examining moral hazard as limitation on insurance). See 
generally Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531 
(1968) (applying economic analysis to moral hazard in medical insurance); Steven Shavell, On 
Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541 (1979) (discussing partial solutions to moral 
hazards). For a broader treatment of the topic, see generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of 
Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996). 
 65 See Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 5, at 538 & n.79 (explaining interaction of 
moral hazard and efficient precautions); Chunchi Wu & Peter F. Colwell, Moral Hazard and 
Moral Imperative, 55 J. RISK & INS. 101, 112–15 (1988) (same). 
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the homeowner will fail to take the necessary precautions.66 
But what are the assumptions built into the pricing of regulatory 
insurance? Coverage must be based upon a firm’s current business rather 
than hypothetical developments and new product lines. Any other approach 
would be too speculative because neither the insurance company nor the 
firm can predict whether new research and development will bear fruit. 
Thus, it would be crucial for insurers to write contracts that provided fixed 
payouts to insured parties in the event of regulatory action (i.e., a promise 
to pay $10 million in the event that Congress enacts a carbon tax). This sort 
of fixed-payment insurance contract—unlike one that protected a firm 
against its full losses without specifying those losses in the contract in 
advance—would protect the insurer against threats of moral hazard.67 
Moreover, this type of pricing would leave in place the firm’s 
incentives to act efficiently. Purchasers of home fire insurance have the 
ability to take effective precautions (such as installing smoke alarms) and 
naturally demand insurance contracts that are priced lower to reflect these 
precautions;68 the moral hazard problem arises because of the cost of 
monitoring. Here, there is no need to create contracts based on speculative 
business developments. The regulated firm can simply insure based on its 
current operations, which are not costly to verify.69 If a line of research 
presents the opportunity for an efficient precaution—by ameliorating a 
firm’s regulatory risk exposure—the firm has appropriate incentives to 
undertake that line of research: If it switches to a less hazardous (and less 
likely to be regulated) chemical, it can negotiate less extensive coverage 
along with lower premiums, allowing the firm to realize the benefits from 
its less risky behavior.70 In this sense, the firm is insured only against 
external regulatory risk, not against the “business” risk presented by failed 
development projects or inadequate research investment. 
Nor would regulatory insurance likely spur any excess investment in 
firm activities. If a firm knows that it will be compensated fully for losses 
in the event of regulation—through the Takings Clause, for instance, or via 
 
 66 See Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 74 (1979) 
(noting role of asymmetric information in causing moral hazard problems due to one contracting 
party’s inability to observe perfectly other party’s behavior). 
 67 See supra note 59 and sources cited therein. 
 68 Social costs are minimized when both parties take all efficient precautions. Robert Cooter, 
Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1985). 
 69 An insurer could employ the same mechanisms that the EPA might use to verify a firm’s 
production or use of a particular chemical and, in many situations, could simply piggyback off of 
already existing permitting and disclosure requirements. The additional advantage of these 
verification efforts is that, in many instances, fraudulent disclosures would be penalized civilly or 
criminally by state or federal authorities rather than as mere instances of contract breach. 
 70 For a discussion of the use of feature ratings in assessing insurance premiums, see 
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
79–82 (1986). 
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grandfathering—it has every incentive to make further investments that 
might soon be destroyed (in the case of a taking) or are inefficient when 
compared with alternatives (in the case of grandfathering).71 Regulatory 
insurance, by contrast, can be priced to deal with these possibilities. 
Standard insurance contracts have coverage limits and are priced according 
to those limits;72 if a firm wishes to expand a line of business and insure 
itself against the risk, the insurer will force it to disclose this expansion and 
pay correspondingly higher premiums.73 So long as the insurer can observe 
actual, relevant firm behavior, and so long as insurance contracts remain 
renegotiable to reflect changed circumstances—both reasonable 
assumptions—this type of regulatory insurance should not generate any 
significant moral hazard. 
b. External Activities 
In contrast to other typical forms of insurance, the triggering events 
for regulatory insurance—legislation or agency action—are entirely 
deliberate and fully “man-made.” As a consequence, insurance against 
regulatory risk would seem particularly subject to moral hazard because the 
events in question are especially susceptible to human influence.74 That is, 
an insurance company may become concerned that an insured firm will not 
take efficient steps to prevent—or might even hasten—regulatory action 
against which the firm is insured.75 
Consider the following basic model involving three actors: a 
regulatory agency, a regulated firm, and an insurer. Absent insurance, the 
firm will lobby the agency in an attempt to forestall or avoid regulation 
where it believes that the costs of lobbying are less than the expected 
 
 71 See Calandrillo, supra note 57, at 493–95 (discussing excess incentives to invest in 
improvements under system of government compensation). 
 72 See Benjamin J. Richardson, Mandating Environmental Liability Insurance, 12 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 293, 295–96 (2002) (describing structure of conventional insurance 
contracts). 
 73 See Michael Spence & Richard Zeckhauser, Insurance, Information, and Individual Action, 
61 AM. ECON. REV. 380, 383 (1971) (analyzing manner in which insurers write typical contracts); 
see also Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 5, at 538–40 (same). 
 74 Of course, arson and theft for hire similarly involve human-catalyzed insurable risks. But 
these are rare, illegal activities deterred by the criminal justice system, and so they do not raise 
the same concerns as the possibility of legal individual action to influence the likelihood of the 
occurrence of a covered event. 
 75 A similar concern motivated the traditional notion that an insurance firm will provide 
coverage only against events that arise from pure “fortuity.” See ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. 
RHODES, HOLMES’S APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 1.4(A) (Eric Mills Holmes ed., 2d ed. 1996) 
(describing fortuity and exclusion of intentional conduct from coverage); BARRY R. OSTRAGER & 
THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 8.02, at 561 (14th ed. 
2008) (“Thus, by definition, insurance is not available for losses that the policyholder knows of, 
planned, intended, or is aware are substantially certain to occur.”); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 1.06(A)(1) (3d ed. Supp. 2010) (to same effect). 
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benefits of avoiding regulation (discounted by the probability that 
regulation will occur nonetheless). If the firm is able to insure, however, it 
no longer bears the risk of regulation and so no longer has any incentive to 
lobby. If the firm is obligated to lobby (such as by contract), or even if it is 
asked to take a position on regulation, the firm will shirk if its effort level is 
costly to monitor. Moreover, under certain circumstances, the firm might 
even lobby in favor of stricter regulation. In particular, if the firm is fully 
insured (and therefore indifferent between regulation and no regulation) but 
believes that its competitors are not as well insured (and are consequently 
more vulnerable to regulatory change), the firm might rationally invest in 
lobbying efforts against its own ostensible interest. 
Insurers, however, should be able to cure these moral hazard problems 
through contract. The parties simply could write regulatory insurance 
contracts to ban any lobbying activities by insured firms (and to force them 
to take no public position on relevant regulatory action). And it should not 
be difficult for insurers to monitor this type of activity. Lobbyists must 
register federally and list their clients;76 holders of public office (and 
candidates) must disclose campaign contributions;77 and the Freedom of 
Information Act,78 along with the Administrative Procedure Act,79 can be 
used to force most private efforts to influence public policy into the open.80 
Certainly the possibility of secret, closed-door meetings between legislators 
and executives of regulated companies always remains, but this type of 
covert activity is far less common and far less likely to be effective without 
the backing of actual monetary support. Because federal laws have forced 
lobbying to become such a public activity, third parties such as insurers 
should have less difficulty monitoring it than they would have overseeing 
the private behavior involved in most typical insurance. 
One remaining question is whether a contract that bans insured firms 
from lobbying would preclude some efficient solutions that the parties 
would otherwise prefer. For instance, lobbying by a regulated firm might 
be an efficient “precaution” against further regulation, akin to installing a 
smoke alarm to guard against fire. If there are gains from allowing firms to 
 
 76 2 U.S.C. §§ 1603–1604 (2006). 
 77 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)–(c) (2006). 
 78 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 79 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006). 
 80 See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 125 (1998) (“[G]ood-government supplements to the APA . . . make 
participation easier by facilitating agency monitoring . . . . [T]hese acts owe their origin in part to 
efforts to render administrative government more open by lowering the costs of monitoring 
agency deliberations.” (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally Cass R. 
Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. 
L. REV. 613, 614 (1998) (describing use of federal statutes to reveal information on public 
deliberations and lobbying). 
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lobby, firms will demand the opportunity to purchase lower-priced 
insurance contracts predicated on their doing so. Once the parties write 
these contracts, the moral hazard problem returns with full force: While an 
insurer can monitor relatively easily whether a firm engages in any quantity 
of lobbying greater than zero (as described above), it will be very costly for 
the insurer to monitor the precise quantity and quality of that lobbying. A 
firm could hire cheaper and less effective lobbyists; it could trade a 
willingness to accept regulation against which it is insured for the blocking 
of another type of regulation for which it has no insurance; and so forth. 
Information regarding the precise details of a firm’s lobbying efforts—
details which easily can have a large influence on the success of those 
efforts—is costly for an outside insurer to access.81 Any insurance contract 
that specifies a nonzero level of lobbying will thus be difficult to monitor 
and subject to possible shirking and moral hazard. 
There is, however, no reason to believe that there are efficiency gains 
from allowing regulated firms to lobby. After all, typical industrial firms 
have no particular expertise in lobbying—they are experts at producing 
whatever good or service they offer in the marketplace. For this reason, and 
in part because lobbying is itself a regulated activity, firms are unlikely to 
do their own lobbying. Instead, they more commonly hire professional 
lobbying firms to advocate for them.82 There is no particular reason why 
 
 81 Indeed, monitoring even the most basic details of a firm’s lobbying efforts would appear to 
be a substantial undertaking. The sheer volume of issues that large firms spend resources on can 
be astounding. For example, a study conducted after the passage of the Lobbying Disclosure Act 
of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1612 
(2006)), found that during the six-month period between July and December 1996, General 
Motors filed 47 reports with the government detailing 157 issues on which they had lobbied and 
spent over $15 million. Frank R. Baumgartner & Beth L. Leech, Studying Interest Groups Using 
Lobbying Disclosure Reports, 18 VOX POP NEWSL. POL. ORGS. & PARTIES (Ray C. Bliss Inst. of 
Applied Politics, Univ. of Akron, Akron, Ohio), Summer 1999, at 1, 2, available at 
http://www.uakron.edu/bliss/docs/Vol_18_Iss_1.pdf. Furthermore, the lobbyists engaged by 
interest groups will often have the discretion to choose both the forms that their lobbying efforts 
will take and the intensity of those efforts. For a discussion of the flexible approach lobbyists 
apply to issue advocacy, see generally Thomas T. Holyoke, Choosing Battlegrounds: Interest 
Group Lobbying Across Multiple Venues, 56 POL. RES. Q. 325 (2003). Lastly, it is difficult to 
imagine how a firm could accurately report the total quantity and effectiveness of its informal or 
grassroots lobbying efforts. See generally KENNETH M. GOLDSTEIN, INTEREST GROUPS, 
LOBBYING, AND PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA (1999) (providing broad-ranging analysis of 
lobbying in United States). Given the range of activities in which firms engage, difficult 
determinations might have to be made about whether ostensibly nonpolitical activities have some 
influence on political access. For example, should charitable donations be monitored as part of a 
firm’s lobbying effort? See Craig Smith, The New Corporate Philanthropy, 72 HARV. BUS. REV., 
May–June 1994, at 105, 109–10 (describing use of charitable donations as form of lobbying). 
 82 See Frank R. Baumgartner & Beth L. Leech, Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons: 
Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics, 63 J. POL. 1191, 1195 tbl.1 (2001) 
(finding that among businesses that participated in substantial lobbying activity, 73% utilized 
professional lobbying firms and only 27% engaged in their own lobbying activities). 
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regulated firms should be the ones to do that hiring; if lobbying is an 
“efficient precaution,” insurers can just as easily be the ones to purchase 
lobbying services. There might even be economies of scale if insurers are 
able to write multiple related insurance contracts and hire single lobbyists 
to advocate for or against regulations that affect each member within the 
group.83 These types of bundled, insured regulatory interests might serve as 
efficient solutions to the collective action problems surrounding lobbying: 
The grouping of related firms under the auspices of one insurer would 
lower the costs of negotiating a cooperative lobbying agreement. In this 
fashion, insurers might even form efficient substitutes for large trade 
associations (which often function primarily as lobbying groups).84 
In a competitive market for regulatory insurance, insurers will have an 
incentive to seek out efficient lobbying precautions in order to compete 
along the dimension of price. It is difficult to know whether the absolute 
amount of lobbying will decrease or increase, and because lobbying often 
(but not always) involves rent-seeking that diminishes social welfare,85 a 
more efficient system of lobbying may not diminish the social harm caused 
by lobbying on the whole. The amount of money spent on lobbying may 
well decrease, however, and a decline in these deadweight expenditures 
almost certainly would be socially beneficial. 
Finally, it is worth noting that a private market for regulatory 
insurance could collapse if the fact that a firm had purchased insurance 
caused the government to regulate that firm more aggressively on the 
theory that the regulation would not substantially harm the firm. If 
insurance itself caused regulation, the price of insurance would rise 
dramatically, likely to the point at which it was no longer economically 
worthwhile for the firm. We do not believe that this pattern will develop for 
 
 83 This practice might of course create other problems of correlated risk, which we address 
infra Part II.B.3. But if insurers are diversified adequately, it should be possible for them to 
obtain economies of scale without subjecting themselves to undue threats. 
 84 See Baumgartner & Leech, supra note 82, at 1194–98 (showing that businesses and trade 
associations account for vast majority of lobbying expenditures); see also Ron Chepesiuk, The 
Environmental Lobbying Game: Who Plays It on Capitol Hill and How, 102 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSP. 640, 640–42 (1994) (discussing lobbying efforts of trade associations in area of 
environmental regulation). We hasten to add that we take no position on whether lobbying is 
socially beneficial or harmful, or what amount of lobbying is optimal. We mean only to argue that 
large-scale regulatory insurance would not likely affect the overall quantity of lobbying. The most 
significant change would simply be a substitution away from trade associations and other interest 
groups and toward insurance companies. 
 85 E.g., Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking State, 64 AM. ECON. 
REV. 291, 295 (1974) (arguing that rent-seeking often leads to welfare losses); see George J. 
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 4–6 (1971) 
(arguing that demand from industry groups shapes form of regulations); cf. Michael Lusztig, The 
Limits of Rent Seeking: Why Protectionists Become Free Traders, 5 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 38 
(1998) (arguing that governments can turn rent-seekers into proponents of free trade by 
convincing them that rents are unavailable). 
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two reasons. First, insurance agreements are private contracts between 
insurer and insured; the government may have no means of discovering 
which parties actually have obtained insurance. Second, insurance 
companies themselves will have an incentive to lobby against regulation 
that will harm them financially. As we note here, it is difficult to know 
whether the overall amount of lobbying would increase or decrease in a 
regime of significant regulatory insurance. Regardless, the fact of insurance 
lobbying will erase the notion that regulatory action against insured parties 
is a “free lunch” for legislators and regulators. If regulation of insured firms 
becomes more common, the increase in regulatory activity likely will be 
commensurate with (and driven by) the welfare gains to be had from 
regulatory insurance in the first instance. There is thus no reason that the 
threat of moral hazard should derail the development of a robust market for 
regulatory insurance. 
2. Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection problems occur when systems of insurance become 
more attractive to riskier firms and individuals, leading them to enroll in 
disproportionate numbers and impose unaccounted costs on insurers.86 
Consider, for instance, an optional health insurance program offered at 
fixed cost to all employees of a particular firm. The greater an individual’s 
health risk, the more valuable the health insurance will be to that 
individual; and because the price of insurance is fixed, the more likely that 
individual will be to enroll in the health plan. This fixed-price plan will 
thus adversely select the most at-risk employees, and the insurer’s costs 
will rise. No matter how high the insurer sets the premium, the plan will 
always attract employees with the highest risks, and the insurer will be 
likely to lose money as a result.87 
Several scholars have suggested that adverse selection problems are 
likely to plague systems designed to insure against takings of real 
property.88 For instance, homeowners who know that they are more likely 
 
 86 See Mark Pauly & Sean Nicholson, Adverse Consequences of Adverse Selection, 24 J. 
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 921, 922 (1999) (describing self-selection process creating adverse 
selection problem); see also George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort 
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1540–42 (1987) (discussing systemic effects of adverse selection); 
Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay 
on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629, 636 (1976) (discussing 
equilibrium of market with imperfect information). 
 87 See Fennell, supra note 63, at 41–43 (describing manner in which adverse selection 
problems can frustrate systems of insurance). 
 88 E.g., Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 7, at 595–96; Calandrillo, supra note 57, at 526–27; 
Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 46, at 286 (“An explanation for lack of private taking insurance . . . 
is adverse selection. A public planner might tip off landowners of an impending taking and 
encourage them to apply for insurance in order to reduce political opposition to his project.”). 
520-307-JM-RELIEF'.DOC 4/28/2010  3:45 PM 
May 2010] INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF TRANSITION RELIEF  125 
 
to be subject to takings will opt into insurance plans at higher rates. Like 
threats of moral hazard, however, adverse selection problems depend at 
their core on information asymmetries. If all relevant information is public, 
insurers can price contracts accurately and higher-risk private parties who 
wish to opt in will be able to do so only at elevated rates. The fear in the 
takings context is that landowners will have better information regarding 
the sorts of local projects that might lead to eminent domain—new roads, 
rail lines, development projects, and the like.89 Local city councils and 
planning boards might discuss these projects in forums—such as town 
meetings—that are easily accessed by local residents but far more opaque 
to national and international insurance companies.90 
These threats may be present in the context of takings of real property, 
but they are unlikely to plague more general regulatory insurance. The key 
to the adverse selection problem for takings insurance is that both the vast 
majority of the relevant governmental action and the potential insured 
parties are local, while the principal insurers are not. It is this geographic 
and political divide that gives rise to the necessary informational 
asymmetries. The types of regulation that concern us here, by contrast, are 
rarely local; they are almost always created by state and federal 
governmental entities. As we have already noted, there is negligible private 
information about these types of regulation (except the information held by 
the government actors themselves), and so regulated firms possess 
essentially no informational advantage over their putative insurers.91 
Without such an asymmetry, there can be no problem of adverse selection. 
3. Uncorrelated Risks 
Another potential hurdle to regulatory insurance lies in the difficulty 
of finding truly uncorrelated risks. Insurance companies exist (and succeed) 
because they are able to diversify across a large portfolio of unconnected 
contracts that offer unrelated risks.92 For instance, house fires in Iowa and 
New York are entirely uncorrelated; no single event will cause both, and 
there is no reason to believe that a fire in one place will cause a fire in 
another. Accordingly, an insurance firm can safely insure a house in Iowa 
 
 89 See Calandrillo, supra note 57, at 526 (noting individuals with inside knowledge of likely 
takings will buy insurance at disproportionate rates). 
 90 In contrast, adverse selection problems are far less likely with respect to takings of, for 
instance, beachfront property. It is no secret whether a parcel of land includes beach access, and 
this is precisely the type of information that insurers are likely to collect before writing insurance 
contracts. 
 91 See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (describing public nature of lobbying and 
regulation, which suggests that regulated firms have no greater access to relevant information on 
regulators than insurers do). 
 92 See Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 
645, 648–53 (1985) (explaining economic advantages of ability to diversify risk). 
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and a house in New York (and, to extrapolate, millions of other homes 
similarly scattered across the country) without fear that one isolated event 
will force the firm to pay benefits to millions of homeowners 
simultaneously. 
It is for this reason that insurance companies have been reluctant to 
write policies insuring against terrorism, natural disasters, or other large-
scale calamities (often referred to as “catastrophe insurance”).93 A single 
hurricane can destroy an enormous swath of housing along the Florida 
coast or (nearly) the entire city of New Orleans, and only an extremely 
large and well-diversified insurer could bear the risk of insuring a 
substantial number of houses in a potential hurricane path. Similarly, 
insurers fear that a major terrorist act—a nuclear, biological, chemical, or 
radiological attack—could destroy or render uninhabitable a substantial 
swath of a major city, not to mention kill tens of thousands of people.94 An 
insurer has only two options in the face of such a large risk: refuse to insure 
more than a handful of people or properties in any major city, or refuse to 
write individual policies that cover acts of terrorism. By and large, insurers 
have chosen the latter. 
Similar problems could conceivably be present in the market for 
regulatory insurance. Regulation, particularly federal regulation, often 
exceeds even natural disasters in scope, affecting hundreds of firms in 
dozens of industries simultaneously, with economic impacts measured in 
the billions of dollars.95 Even state-level regulation can have potent and 
 
 93 See Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, and 
Uninsurable Risks, 64 J. RISK & INS. 205, 206 (1997) (noting that “catastrophe risks” may be 
uninsurable if they are “too large”); see also Mario Miranda & Dmitry V. Vedenov, Innovations 
in Agricultural and Natural Disaster Insurance, 83 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 650 (2001) (discussing 
unwillingness of traditional insurance markets to cover agricultural products in event of 
catastrophe and offering as solution possible securitization of these risks); cf. Daniel A. Farber, 
Uncertainty as a Basis for Standing, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1123, 1129 (2005) (“[T]he president of 
the Reinsurance Association of America has reportedly warned that global warming could 
bankrupt the insurance industry.”). 
 94 See Ronald E. Ferguson, Chairman, General Re Corp., Statement on the Impact of the 
September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks on the U.S. Insurance and Reinsurance Industry (Sept. 26, 
2001), http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/092601fe.pdf (predicting that U.S. insurance 
industry would be unable to sustain effects of multiple attacks on level of those witnessed on 
September 11). However, the extent to which insurers will be liable in the event of a future 
terrorist attack is still largely uncertain. See Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The 
Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 790–98 (2005) (explaining that, in spite of 
federal government’s efforts to require coverage of terrorist attacks by insurance companies, vast 
majority of policies still contain valid exclusions for nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks, 
and arguing that terrorism in United States is essentially uninsurable). 
 95 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE TOTAL COSTS OF CLEANING UP NONFEDERAL 
SUPERFUND SITES 15–16 (1994), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4845/EntireReport.pdf (estimating that continuing costs to 
private parties for Superfund cleanups would exceed $43 billion). For a wide-ranging look at and 
critique of ex ante cost assessments and the lack of retrospective empirical studies determining 
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widespread effects, particularly if it comes from a populous, highly 
industrialized state such as California or New York.96 The difficulty in 
assembling a portfolio of truly uncorrelated risk positions in the face of 
such widespread single-event threats might be preventing a robust market 
for regulatory insurance from forming. 
We do not, however, believe that this is the case. There is a crucial 
distinction between regulatory insurance and catastrophe or terrorism 
insurance: Well-conceived regulatory insurance will cover only one (or a 
finite number) of the potential business risks to a firm, while catastrophe 
insurance effectively forces the insurer to assume the risk of the destruction 
of the entire enterprise. For instance, any given firm might use dozens of 
potentially regulated chemicals and employ dozens of potentially regulated 
workplace practices, each of which accounts for some small proportion of 
the firm’s value. A potential insurer could select which of these many 
available risks it is willing to assume, knowing that any individual 
regulation would lead only to a partial decrease in firm value—not the 
complete destruction of the firm that might occur in the event of a 
hurricane.97 
In a competitive marketplace of multiple insurers, any given firm 
should be able to find one or more insurers willing to take on any given 
slice of risk. Imagine, for instance, a world in which there are N potentially 
harmful chemicals (Chemicals 1, 2, 3, . . . N), and J potentially regulated 
employment practices (Practices 1, 2, 3, . . . J). A given insurer might elect 
to write policies for some firms using Chemical 1 in California, Iowa, and 
Georgia, some firms using Chemical 2 in New York and Illinois, some 
firms employing Practice 5 in North Carolina and Arizona, and so forth. 
With a sufficient number of insurers to spread the total nationwide risk, 
firms should be able to purchase coverage for any risks that they wish to 
amortize. There are limits to this principle if an insufficient number of 
insurers enter the marketplace; for instance, the fiftieth firm using 
Chemical 2 in California might be unable to acquire coverage if there are 
too few independent insurance companies.98 But at least some insurance, 
 
compliance costs for various regulatory programs, see generally Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth 
Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
1997 (2002). 
 96 Regulations in a state such as California can affect businesses located elsewhere that 
merely do business in California, forcing them to adjust their practices if they hope to maintain 
their access to that valuable market. See John M. Broder, Obama Directs Regulators To Tighten 
Auto Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/us/politics/27calif.html (describing effects of allowing states 
such as California and New York to set higher automobile mileage standards). 
 97 This is the equivalent of a homeowner’s insurance policy protecting only the furniture or 
the second bedroom against fire, rather than the entire house. 
 98 Suppose there are fifty California firms that use the same chemical and only two regulatory 
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perhaps for less commonly used chemicals, should be available. A fear of 
correlated risks, therefore, cannot account for the complete absence of a 
market for regulatory insurance.99 
There is, however, one potential respect in which nationwide 
regulatory risks could be correlated: the case of a large political transition, 
a substantial transfer of power from one party to another within one or 
more branches of government.100 For instance, a new administration that 
assumes power with a commanding mandate and a set of preferences that 
differs significantly from the status quo (or from the prior administration) 
might undertake a sweeping set of regulations, covering a swath of 
environmental and economic fields. Yet this outcome, while possible, is 
highly unlikely. No President regulates every possible field of endeavor; 
the total number of regulations within any four-year period, even if it 
appears large to the naked eye, represents only a small fraction of the 
conceivable regulations that the government might create (and against 
which firms might have insured).101 In fact, there is not a great deal of 
variation in the total number of regulations among modern administrations; 
the most prolific regulators were not significantly more active than the 
least.102 Even if there were variation, however, insurers could simply write 
policies that expire before a change in administration and reprice insurance 
contracts to accord with new risks presented by an incoming party. 
 
insurers in the marketplace. Each insurer might be willing to write only twenty contracts on the 
same regulatory risk within the same jurisdiction for fear of taking on too much correlated risk. 
Under these circumstances, only forty of the firms would be able to obtain coverage for 
regulatory risk related to that chemical, and ten firms would remain uninsured. 
 99 It is worth noting that we do not think that the threat of correlated risks can account fully 
for the absence of a catastrophe or terrorism insurance market, either. All of these same options 
for managing risk are available to the firms that write such policies, and firms need only limit the 
number of policies written in one geographic area if they wish to contain their overall risk 
exposure. Furthermore, financial services firms are adept at slicing financial products and 
securities into tranches, each of which contains a small piece of a large number of financial 
instruments. The resulting financial products can help distribute risk and guard against all but the 
most widely spread national risks. Natural disasters are essentially never national phenomena, and 
only the most serious conceivable terrorist threat would have national reach—at which point 
paying insurance claims might no longer be a relevant consideration. Instead, we think that the 
lack of a viable market for these types of insurance products is attributable to the cause we 
describe infra Part II.B.4. 
 100 We hasten to add that a transfer from Democratic to Republican control might be no less 
threatening than a transfer in the opposite direction, despite the fact that Republicans are 
conventionally thought to favor less regulation than Democrats. In many cases, firms may wish to 
insure against deregulation; for instance, a firm that has developed a safe alternative to CFCs and 
staked a sizeable investment in their continued regulation might want to insure against 
deregulation of the ozone-depleting gas. The model we present here is fully generalizable to any 
legislative or agency action, regardless of direction. 
 101 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the 
Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 931 chart 1 (2008) (demonstrating that federal 
bureaucracy as whole produces on order of 800–1000 regulations per year). 
 102 See id. (comparing George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations). 
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We do not wish to overstate these conclusions; the threat of correlated 
regulatory risks is not trivial. But we do not believe that it can explain the 
complete dearth of regulatory insurance. Rather, we believe that the 
explanation lies with a difficulty more fundamental to insurance markets, 
and one that is less easily surmounted. 
4. The Difficulties in Regulatory Pricing 
Amidst all of the concern regarding moral hazard, adverse selection, 
and correlated risk problems in the market for regulatory insurance, 
scholars have almost entirely ignored the problem of pricing such 
insurance. Pricing difficulties are, of course, not unique to regulatory 
insurance, and they can plague systematic efforts to buy and sell 
probabilistic options of all types.103 Yet regulatory actions undertaken by 
governments are fundamentally different from the types of events that form 
the subject of most insurance products, and the problems that they create 
are different in kind from those that exist in traditional insurance contexts. 
As one might expect from a multi-trillion dollar industry, the 
mechanics of pricing insurance are objective and actuarial. When deciding 
whether to write a policy insuring a car, a home, or a person’s health, 
insurance companies consult complicated matrices of risk factors and 
results, assessing the risk involved in a particular project based upon the 
rate of accidents that have befallen similarly situated individuals.104 
Insurance companies know how much to charge a married, male, twenty-
seven-year-old driver of a family sedan living in the 02143 zip code for 
automobile insurance because they have data on the rate of accidents 
among drivers in that same demographic and geographic stratum.105 Each 
driver or each homeowner is responsible for a series of independent events 
that insurers can assemble and analyze. Moreover, accident data are usable 
and reliable because they are voluminous—millions of insured drivers 
drive tens of millions of miles per day and file thousands of accident 
reports. An insurer need only accumulate the necessary data and develop 
 
 103 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. 
L. REV. 942, 955–76 (1988) (laying blame for unavailability of environmental liability insurance 
in mid-1980s partly on inability of insurance firms to assess expected losses due to high levels of 
legal uncertainty created by then-recent expansion of environmental liability). 
 104 For a discussion of risk classification, see generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and 
Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L. REV. 403 (1985), which attempts to resolve 
the tension between the efficiency-promoting and risk-distributional features of classification, and 
Keith J. Crocker & Arthur Snow, The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the 
Insurance Industry, 94 J. POL. ECON. 321 (1986), which argues that costless imperfect 
categorization, such as that based on age, sex, or race, always increases efficiency. 
 105 See Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 
519–26 (1983) (explaining methodology employed by insurance companies to estimate accident 
rates for classes of insured individuals). 
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corresponding pricing models. With sufficiently large data sets, individual 
variations will wash out, and insurers will know approximately what they 
are bargaining for when they agree to insure a given individual—on 
average, one married twenty-seven-year-old with a sedan behaves much 
like another. 
None of this is possible in the context of regulatory insurance for a 
number of interconnected reasons. First, in comparison to typical accidents, 
significant regulatory acts occur extremely infrequently, usually numbering 
just below one thousand per year nationally.106 Even this description 
overstates their quantity in the same way that a reporting of all fires, floods, 
automobile accidents, and illnesses would overstate the effective number of 
insurance claims (and thus the number of useful data points) in a given 
year. Each federal agency issues no more than a handful of regulations each 
year, and thus any given regulatory field is altered only rarely.107 Without a 
broader pool of data to draw upon, an insurance firm cannot reliably 
estimate the hazards presented by any given regulation. 
Second, unlike traffic accidents or house fires, regulatory acts are 
effectively one-off, nonstochastic events. An individual fitting a given 
demographic profile in 2005 is, for the most part, equally likely to have an 
automobile accident as a similarly situated individual in 2006—what 
variation exists is captured by the easily obtainable demographic 
information that insurers collect. Accordingly, data from 2005 are useful in 
predicting 2006 outcomes, data from 2004 are useful in predicting both 
2005 and 2006, and so on. The likelihood of a particular regulation, on the 
other hand, depends upon a wide variety of factors the impact of which is 
often unobservable or unpredictable. A shift in agency leadership or 
political priorities, a transfer of governmental power, a change in 
membership or chairmanship on a key committee, or even new 
developments in science or technology (or culture) can affect the 
probability of any given regulation in any particular field in unforeseeable 
ways.108 In addition, the uncertainty and variance in regulatory outcomes 
 
 106 O’Connell, supra note 101, at 931. We have not been able to locate reliable data, but we 
suspect that states are somewhat less prolific, with dozens to hundreds of state regulatory acts per 
year. 
 107 The most prolific regulator, the Department of the Interior, averages approximately 100 
regulations per year, with a high of 200. Id. at 939 chart 5. A variety of other federal agencies, 
including the Department of Commerce, Department of Transportation, SEC, FCC, and EPA 
average between 25 and 100 regulations per year. Id. In addition, many agency regulations are not 
truly “regulatory” in the sense that private firms or other interested parties would understand the 
term. Many concern internal agency procedures or set nonbinding guidelines and thus are 
unlikely to be the type of actions that firms would wish to insure against. Presumably, a large 
percentage of the Department of the Interior’s activities, which concern internal management of 
federal lands, fall into that category. Accordingly, the number of data points available to an 
insurer are likely substantially lower than the rough estimates that we present as upper bounds. 
 108 Cf. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & 
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generated by single events can be tremendous. Publicity about evidence of 
a disappearing ozone layer may have made regulation of CFCs vastly more 
likely;109 it is unlikely that any single action would raise the rates of 
automobile accidents in the same way.110 
Worse still, regulation in one period is not necessarily a good proxy 
for regulation in another period. The fact that the EPA regulated carbon 
monoxide during the 1970s is not a good indicator of what action the 
agency will take with respect to carbon dioxide today—the two are very 
different chemicals that present widely variant risks and raise distinct 
economic questions. Similarly, the fact that the EPA has acted once to 
regulate the level of arsenic in drinking water has ambiguous effects on the 
likelihood that the agency will act again, either to raise or lower allowable 
levels. It may indicate that a similarly situated EPA will tighten the arsenic 
standard; it may lead the EPA to learn that the current level of protection is 
needlessly high and prompt a relaxation of those limits; or it may simply 
indicate that the EPA already has selected a near-optimal level of 
regulation and the status quo is likely to persist. Based on available 
quantitative data alone, an outside observer has almost no capacity to select 
among these possibilities.111 Even the meaning of potential explanatory 
variables can change over time, and often rapidly. Democrats in Georgia in 
1972 were very different than Democrats in Georgia in 1992, who were in 
turn very different than Democrats in Georgia in 2006.112 
Third, the likelihood of regulation may well be endogenous to the rate 
of insurance. Suppose that a firm that manufactures a hazardous chemical 
insures against regulation of that chemical, and the insurance company 
includes a clause in the insurance contract barring the firm from 
 
POL’Y REV. 149 (2006) (describing effect of differing cultural worldviews on risk perception and 
policy priorities); Masur, supra note 7, at 1041–47 (describing possibility of rapid shifts in 
government policy and potentially deleterious effects of such shifts). 
 109 See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2007) (describing public reaction to discovery of ozone-depleting effects and 
subsequent industry reductions on production). 
 110 It is, of course, possible that some major change in law or technology—the repeal of speed 
limits or the advent of airbags—could have dramatic effects on accident rates or costs. But these 
sorts of events are uncommon and often predictable, and they produce new equilibria that again 
become susceptible to large-scale data collection and analysis. In the end, our point is a 
comparative one: Pricing automobile insurance has become a science due to the predictable 
nature of accident rates, but pricing regulatory insurance remains ineluctably an art. 
 111 In other words, automobile accidents are independent events, while regulatory activities are 
not. Because of the idiosyncrasies inherent to the regulatory process, it is unlikely that insurers 
will have enough information to navigate the endogeneities involved in pricing insurance 
contracts. 
 112 Cf. Merle Black, The Transformation of the Southern Democratic Party, 66 J. POL. 1001, 
1002–05 (2004) (describing diminishing power and presence of conservative whites in southern 
Democratic Party over time and rise of Republican Party as viable alternative). 
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lobbying.113 The existence of this insurance contract alters the probability 
of regulation: Congress or an agency may be subject to more or less 
lobbying activity, depending on whether the insurer chooses to lobby in the 
firm’s stead. But an insurer writing a policy at time x may not know 
whether other industrial firms will choose to insure (with other insurance 
companies) at times x+1, x+2, and so forth, and thus may be unable to 
gauge the likelihood of regulation at future moments. 
Finally, much of the information needed to make possible fine-grained 
analysis of the likelihood of some regulatory measure is not publicly 
available, and many of the relevant government processes are not 
transparent. Agencies are typically required to publish notice of proposed 
rulemaking and solicit comments before the rules go into effect, but this 
notice often comes late in the regulatory game, long after principal 
decisionmakers have decided to embark on a course of action.114 A 
significant amount of regulatory law is also made through adjudication, and 
potentially regulated firms may have little notice that an issue is even 
before a court, much less subject to regulatory change.115 Similarly, 
legislative actions are nominally public—a bill is introduced, committees 
hold hearings, and votes are taken, all in the public eye. Of course, in 
reality much of the salient legislative work takes place behind closed doors 
in private meetings, and bills that appear publicly to concern one topic can 
rapidly be transformed to cover another.116 These informational problems 
are not insurmountable—after all, automobile insurers do not have access 
 
 113 As noted above, this type of clause is likely to be included in a regulatory insurance 
contract in order to avoid risks associated with moral hazard. See supra notes 76–80 and 
accompanying text. 
 114 See Beth S. Noveck & David R. Johnson, A Complex(ity) Strategy for Breaking the 
Logjam, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 170, 177 (2008) (describing regulations as “a fait accompli” 
before traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking purports to solicit outside expertise); see also 
E. Donald Elliott, Re-inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492–94 (1992) (arguing that 
formal public notice-and-comment procedures have little to no effect on rulemaking but are used 
primarily to build detailed record for judicial review after proposed rule has already “jelled” into 
its final form); Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative 
Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 621–23 (2002) (suggesting that agencies can suffer from 
“lock-in,” or inflexible commitment to previously decided upon policy, which undermines 
“regulatory goals of participation and deliberation”). 
 115 See Peter L. Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive 
Department: Reflections on the Interior Department’s Administration of the Mining Law, 74 
COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1238 (1974) (noting that decisions are often unavailable and that affected 
parties often lack notification); Russell L. Weaver, Chenery II: A Forty-Year Retrospective, 40 
ADMIN. L. REV. 161, 165–66 (1988) (citing criticism of adjudicative process for lack of notice or 
public input). 
 116 See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, 
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1949–52 (2008) 
(arguing that internal congressional processes, including private conference committee meetings 
and strategic voting behavior, lead to legislative transparency that is “only skin deep” for all but 
most savvy and connected special interest groups). 
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to the private thoughts of drivers in the moments before they lose 
concentration and cause accidents. But, at a minimum, they complicate 
efforts to analyze the probabilities of regulatory action based on observable 
factors by raising the possibility of omitted variable bias. 
Given a sufficient quantity of data, skilled economists and actuaries 
might be able to sort through this extensive variation and arrive at 
reasonably predictive models. It may be that the likelihood of water quality 
regulation is highly correlated with the number of Democrats on a 
particular committee and the number of years until the committee chairman 
must run for reelection. But with a comparatively small number of 
regulatory actions in any given time period, there is simply no opportunity 
to amass the data necessary to render such calculations feasible or 
meaningful. Regulatory insurance would force insurers to radically alter the 
way in which they traditionally do business, moving toward more 
subjective evaluation of likely political outcomes. This is an activity for 
which they are ill-suited, and requires a set of skills that few people within 
these firms likely possess.117 And without either workable data or fine-
grained political expertise, insurers simply will be unable to price 
regulatory contracts with any accuracy. In the presence of such high 
uncertainty, it is not surprising that insurance companies have shied away 
from entering the market.118 
C. Government Facilitation of a Market for Regulatory Insurance 
In many cases, government intervention can be useful in ameliorating 
the problems that prevent robust private markets from developing.119 
 
 117 Cf. W. Brinkley Dickerson, Jr. et al., Note to SEC: “Reasonably Likely To Be Enacted?” 
You Have Got To Be Kidding!, TROUTMAN SANDERS, Mar. 3, 2010, 
http://www.troutmansanders.com/note-to-sec-reasonably-likely-to-be-enacted-you-have-got-to-
be-kidding-03-03-2010 (citing Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act Release No. 
9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010)) (expressing disbelief 
that private firms could possibly gauge which regulations or legislation are likely to be enacted in 
given year). The SEC interpreted § 303 of Regulation SK, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2009), to require 
management to “evaluate whether . . . pending legislation or regulation is reasonably likely to be 
enacted. Unless management determines that it is not reasonably likely to be enacted, it must 
proceed on the assumption that the legislation or regulation will be enacted.” Disclosure Related 
to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6296. 
 118 We suspect that a similar explanation underlies the lack of catastrophe or terrorism 
insurance. Devastating hurricanes and crippling acts of terrorism are similarly infrequent, highly 
contingent events for which no reliable actuarial data exists. Lacking traditional predictive tools, 
insurers are likely reticent to gamble on uncertain outcomes with high variance. 
 119 Cf. Robert B. Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in the 
Creation of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 336–41 (2003) (suggesting that 
government can play role in overcoming network effects that might impede development of 
robust private markets); Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1179, 
1184–95 (describing situations in which government regulation is and is not necessary to 
facilitate private ordering). 
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Government-provided legal support for the insurance industry is nothing 
new, despite the fact that governmental involvement is hardly essential to 
the existence of traditional private insurance. For instance, criminal 
penalties for insurance fraud—which are publicly administered and 
funded—serve as a valuable supplement to private contract remedies.120 
The case for government intervention in the market for regulatory 
insurance is even stronger and more straightforward. If, in fact, it is a lack 
of transparency and certainty in governmental operations that causes 
pricing problems and inhibits the growth of a market for regulatory 
insurance, then the government might be able to remedy this failure 
through greater clarity and the provision of more complete public 
information. 
Accordingly, Congress (or state legislatures) could take a number of 
steps to facilitate the pricing of insurance contracts on regulatory action. 
The legislature could force agencies to set agendas and priorities well in 
advance of action, deviating from a set agenda only upon a showing of 
particular need. Congress could curtail ex parte contacts and lobbying 
between regulated firms and policymakers, forcing a greater proportion of 
agency activity and decisionmaking into public view. Similarly, Congress 
could scale back the provisions of the APA that permit agencies to make 
rules without opportunity for notice and comment.121 Congress could even 
go so far as to limit the number of regulations that an agency could 
promulgate in a given year, restricting the flow of potential agency 
actions.122 And Congress or the courts could adjust the rules that allow 
numerous agencies, such as the National Labor Relations Board, to make 
 
 120 In theory, increased sanctions for fraud help to deter fraudulent behavior by consumers, 
lowering costs for insurers and reducing the premiums that honest insurance customers must pay. 
Cf. Mark A. Cohen, The Economics of Crime and Punishment: Implications for Sentencing of 
Economic Crimes and New Technology Offenses, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 503, 506–07 (2000) 
(discussing fraud risk and attempts to prevent fraud as increasing costs for other consumers). 
Similarly, securities disclosure laws such as Sarbanes-Oxley represent governmental attempts to 
cure irrationalities, failures, and information asymmetries in the securities markets. See Pub. L. 
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 
U.S.C.). Whether they are successful or necessary is a separate matter, and one on which we 
express no opinion here. Compare J. Robert Brown, Jr., Criticizing the Critics: Sarbanes-Oxley 
and Quack Corporate Governance, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 309, 319–34 (2006) (arguing that it is too 
early to determine whether Sarbanes-Oxley has been successful), with Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-
Oxley and the Cross-listing Premium, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1857, 1875–95 (2007) (finding that 
Sarbanes-Oxley has created greater costs than benefits for certain classes of firms as investors 
believed it would). 
 121 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2006) (permitting rulemaking without notice and comment under 
certain circumstances). 
 122 Of course, significant costs would accompany these measures—costs that might well 
outweigh whatever benefits they would provide. We raise these possibilities only as a thought 
experiment, in the interest of analyzing what measures Congress might take to facilitate pricing of 
regulatory insurance. 
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policy through case-by-case adjudication, forcing regulatory actors toward 
the greater certainty of notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
Similarly, Congress could alter its own behavior in order to provide 
greater predictability to regulated firms. It could rewrite the rules governing 
floor amendments to prohibit significant legislative modification from 
taking place outside of the more structured confines of committees. 
Congress could force committees to set their agendas further in advance in 
order to provide greater notice or require that sponsors publish potential 
amendments well in advance. Indeed, one could imagine a panoply of 
classic “good government” mechanisms that Congress could draw upon to 
make the processes of legislation more transparent and predictable to 
regulated firms and their putative insurers.123 
In the end, however, all of these measures would produce little more 
than marginal gains. There is nothing that the government can do to 
ameliorate the fundamental lack of regulatory data (other than dramatically 
increase the rate of regulation). And there is little that the government can 
do to improve the problems that attend extrapolation of one data point to 
another—for instance, the fact that arsenic regulation in Period 1 has 
ambiguous effects on arsenic regulation in Period 2.124 Congress might 
demand a wholesale yearly reevaluation by every agency of every 
regulatory standard in place (and of all currently unregulated areas as well), 
but it is highly unlikely that the benefits of such an effort would justify its 
enormous costs. 
In addition, there are both practical and political limits to how 
predictable and transparent government action can become. Government 
must always be able to adapt to changing circumstances and respond to 
new problems, and so it is unrealistic to expect all agenda setting to take 
place years or even months in advance. And it is unreasonable to believe 
that all relevant policymaking could (or should) be forced into public view. 
Governments, like private firms, depend on being able to debate and decide 
certain questions in secret, and there are many regulatory decisions that 
agencies would be unwise to make in fully public fashion.125 The 
unregimented nature of the democratic process is responsible for the 
preponderance of the pricing problems that inhibit a market for regulatory 
 
 123 See generally Teresa Dale Pupillo, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in the 
Sunshine in the 1990s—An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1165 (1993) 
(cataloging state “sunshine laws” that provide for open government and greater public 
information on legislative and regulatory processes). 
 124 See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text. 
 125 See, e.g., DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321, 1332 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974) 
(permitting agency to avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking because of fear that private parties 
would evade rules and render them useless); Clay Broad. Corp. of Tex. v. United States, 464 F.2d 
1313, 1320 (5th Cir. 1971) (permitting agency to proceed without notice-and-comment 
rulemaking because of unacceptable delay that procedure would entail). 
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insurance from developing, and these problems cannot be cured without 
twisting the democratic process into unrecognizable shape. 
In the end, we remain pessimistic about the prospects for the 
development of a thick market for regulatory insurance. The theoretical 
hurdles to pricing such contracts are significant, given the infrequency and 
incommensurability of regulation at the national or state level. 
Governmental options for facilitating the growth of such a market are 
inadequate and not well-targeted to the market’s fundamental problems. 
Were the absence of such a market attributable to mere moral hazard or 
adverse selection problems, the government might be capable of curing the 
market’s failure through increased dissemination of information or even 
mandatory disclosures of private conditions backed by penalties for fraud. 
But the deeper difficulties involved in accurately pricing such uncertain 
instruments cannot be so easily solved. 
III 
INFORMATION MARKETS AND REGULATORY DERIVATIVES 
If we cannot trust governmental actors to provide efficient transition 
relief, and if the difficulties involved in properly pricing regulatory 
insurance frustrate private insurance markets, then perhaps traders could 
develop financial derivatives that would allow firms to hedge their 
regulatory risk. This Part explores that possibility. 
A. Regulatory Derivatives in Conception 
A derivative is simply the genus name for any financial instrument 
that acquires a particular value on a given date based on some underlying 
event or set of circumstances. For instance, a derivative might be pegged to 
the S&P 500 Index and be worth one cent for each point at which the index 
is valued when it closes on December 31, 2010.126 The originating financial 
institution simply specifies through contract language the terms upon which 
investors will value the derivative, and then investors can trade the 
derivatives on open financial markets as if they were typical stocks. The 
trading price will reflect the market’s prediction as to the likelihood of the 
outcome in question.127 
Derivatives have proven useful for hedging risk in a variety of 
contexts in which traditional insurance is unavailable because of one type 
 
 126 In a more straightforward fashion, a bank might create a derivative that is worth $1 if the 
S&P 500 Index closes above 1000 points on December 31, 2010, and $0 if it closes below 1000 
points on that date. A derivative might also be written to be worth $1 if the Boston Red Sox win 
the 2010 World Series and $0 if they do not. 
 127 For instance, if the median trader believes that there is a fifty percent chance that the Red 
Sox will win the World Series, the Red Sox derivatives will trade at around fifty cents. 
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of market failure or another. For instance, farmers often fear wide swings 
in profits due to weather variations; a particularly dry year can cause 
immense damage to a crop and put an agricultural business at risk of 
failure. Standard crop insurance, however, which would compensate a 
farmer directly for a lean year, is expensive and difficult to purchase 
because risks tend to be systemic and thus “cannot be diversified away.”128 
A farmer who has insurance might not make all reasonable efforts to 
protect a crop—particularly if those efforts are expensive—and it could be 
difficult for an insurer to monitor the farmer’s behavior without stationing 
an auditor at the farm around the clock. Similarly, farmers might have 
private information regarding their own susceptibility to drought (the 
quality of their irrigation systems, for instance), and would opt for 
insurance only when their risk is especially high. 
The solution is a weather-indexed derivative, pegged to the amount of 
rainfall or sunshine in a particular region during a particular growing 
season.129 For instance, a derivative might be valued at $1 for every inch of 
rainfall that eastern Kansas receives in June, July, and August. A farmer 
assesses how much money she stands to lose if rainfall drops below a 
certain level and trades enough derivatives to cover those losses. By buying 
and selling weather derivatives, a farmer can guarantee a consistent income 
across a period of years while paying only a small premium to smooth out 
the variance generated by dramatic swings in the weather. 
Similarly, the Chicago Board of Trade sells derivatives pegged to the 
Case-Shiller Housing Index, an economic measure of the value of a median 
home in major metropolitan areas across the country.130 Suppose a 
homeowner in San Francisco wishes to insure herself against a decline in 
the value of her home. Direct, first-party insurance is unavailable. It is too 
difficult to price the homeowner’s loss unless she actually sells her house, 
and even a sale creates moral hazard problems because the homeowner and 
the insurance company may not agree on how much time and energy the 
homeowner should invest in extracting the best price or how long the house 
should remain on the market. Instead, the homeowner can purchase (or, 
more accurately, sell short) enough Case-Shiller futures to cover potential 
losses, figuring that declines in the median home price will be proportional 
to declines in the value of her own home. Because no single person can 
 
 128 Miranda & Vedenov, supra note 93, at 650 (adding that high rates lead to decreased 
demand and adverse selection problems). 
 129 Id. at 652. The derivative solves the moral hazard problem by acquiring value based on 
events (e.g., the weather) that no one can control, as opposed to events that are under the farmer’s 
influence (e.g., the farmer’s crop yield). 
 130 See Standard & Poor’s, Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/home/en/us (follow “S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices” 
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 2, 2010). 
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manipulate an entire housing market, Case-Shiller derivatives both solve 
the moral hazard problem and allow individuals to recover losses from 
declining home values without ever putting their homes up for sale. 
It is easy to imagine how people might design and deploy derivatives 
as hedges against regulatory risk. A financial institution could simply 
create a wide variety of derivative products pegged to potential regulations: 
a derivative worth $1 if the EPA acts to regulate a given chemical by a 
particular date and $0 otherwise; a derivative pegged to the carbon tax rate 
imposed by Congress (conditional on Congress creating a carbon tax); and 
so forth. Regulated firms would calculate their own potential losses in the 
event of regulation and trade the derivatives in the quantities necessary to 
insure against those losses. As long as the derivatives were designed with 
adequate specificity, a firm should have little trouble locating an 
appropriate financial hedge. 
In fact, these types of derivatives are functionally equivalent to 
already-existing information markets. Information markets offer traders the 
opportunity to place bets on future events with the object of generating 
information as to the probability of that event occurring. For instance, 
Intrade, an Irish information market, offers derivatives contracts based 
upon events such as whether the United States will impose domestic 
greenhouse gas limitations; whether a bill legalizing internet gambling will 
pass; and whether the federal government will provide an additional $25 
billion to U.S. automakers in 2009.131 Creating vast numbers of additional 
markets to cover a panoply of potential regulations would be trivial; the 
only cost would be in the careful definition and drafting of contract 
terms.132 Information markets are meant to act as predictors of future 
events, not as mechanisms for hedging substantial risks, but they will 
operate equally well as the latter. The fact that many such markets already 
exist makes deploying them as full-scale, effective sources of transition 
relief seem tantalizingly possible. 
 
 131 Intrade, http://www.intrade.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2010). 
 132 There is also the matter of legalizing these markets in the United States; Intrade’s legal 
status is somewhat uncertain. The only operating real-money information market whose legality 
is not in question in the United States is the Iowa Electronic Markets, run by the University of 
Iowa’s Tippie College of Business. See Iowa Electronic Markets, http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/ 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2010). There is also a new information market that plans to allow 
participants to bet real money on Hollywood box office figures. See Joseph Plambeck, A Place To 
Bet Real Money on Movies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/11/business/media/11futures.html. Of course, this market will 
be of little interest to regulated firms outside of Hollywood. 
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B. The Failing Market for Derivatives 
1. The Market’s Absence 
Despite the obvious utility of derivatives as regulatory risk hedges, 
and despite the existence of some roughly equivalent information markets, 
these financial products are underdeveloped and underutilized to an extent 
that casts doubt on their long-term feasibility. There are currently no 
regulatory derivatives in existence, and even the few regulation-related 
information markets that have sprung up have garnered almost no attention. 
The three Intrade markets discussed in the previous Section have a total 
lifetime trading volume of less than $10,000.133 Without a robust market 
and substantial liquidity—in the billions or trillions of dollars—such 
products are useless as mechanisms for hedging regulatory risk. 
The underdevelopment of a robust market for regulatory derivatives 
mirrors the similar absence of regulatory insurance. Information markets 
and derivatives, like standard insurance contracts, depend upon 
assessments of probability: A trader will only buy or sell a derivative 
contract if she can estimate the likelihood of the event in question to some 
degree of certainty.134 Accordingly, firms will struggle to price these 
financial products accurately for all of the same reasons that insurance 
companies cannot price standard first-person regulatory insurance.135 
Regulated firms will be loath to invest substantial resources in ventures 
shrouded in such uncertainty; after all, the point is to hedge risk, and 
trading in uncertain regulatory derivatives has a great deal more in common 
with gambling. 
Derivatives markets function differently, however, than first-party 
insurance markets in important ways. Adverse selection problems are 
unknown in derivatives markets because the identities of the participants 
are irrelevant. How much the party on the other side of the transaction 
stands to lose if the government regulates does not affect the costs to a 
given derivatives trader. Similarly, parties could easily avoid any threat of 
correlated risks simply by avoiding purchasing too large a bundle of linked 
derivatives. 
On the other hand, moral hazard problems are greater in the context of 
derivatives trades than in that of first-person insurance because it is 
 
 133 Intrade, supra note 131 (use “Market Search” to locate market, then look at value in “Vol” 
column of displayed table). This low trading volume is potentially due to a number of factors, 
including the questionable legality of trading on Intrade and the lack of interest in those particular 
markets. Still, the extremely modest volume is striking and likely indicative of larger problems. 
 134 Cf. supra Part II.A (discussing need for regulatory insurance in order to encourage 
investment). 
 135 See supra Part II.B.4 (discussing difficulty of pricing regulatory insurance). 
520-307-JM-RELIEF'.DOC 4/28/2010  3:45 PM 
140 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:nnn 
 
difficult for trading parties to write sophisticated contracts. As we note 
above, insurance firms can solve the moral hazard problem by writing 
contracts that bar insured parties from lobbying.136 On a derivatives market, 
this is not so easy. In order for the derivatives contracts to be tradable on an 
exchange, the contracts must be standardized. The parties will not be able 
to negotiate them on an individualized basis. Even if the standard 
derivatives contract specified that neither the purchaser nor the seller may 
lobby—a condition that most parties are unlikely to accept—the holders of 
these derivatives are often difficult to identify after the fact. Accordingly, it 
is likely that a thick derivatives market does not exist due to some 
combination of the same pricing problems that plague first-party insurance 
and the threat of moral hazard. 
The government could, of course, attempt to catalyze such a market on 
its own by acting as a broker. It could sell fixed-price bundles of 
derivatives—for instance, a derivative worth $1 if the EPA regulates 
carbon dioxide packaged with a derivative worth $1 if it does not—in the 
hope that firms would then trade those financial products among 
themselves.137 Or it could auction regulatory derivatives in the same 
manner as it does Treasury bills and allow the auction to set the price.138 
Yet none of these solutions will cure endemic pricing or moral hazard 
problems, and none will induce the necessary levels of participation if 
firms cannot already price the derivatives accurately. As a class, derivatives 
are useful mechanisms for solving certain types of market failures and for 
making insurance contracts tradable on open markets. They are not 
panaceas for preexisting difficulties in pricing risk.139 
 
 136 See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. 
 137 This is the approach currently taken by the Iowa Electronic Markets. For an analysis of 
different methods for structuring prediction markets, see Michael Abramowicz, Information 
Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 933, 948–49 (2004). 
 138 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, How Treasury Auctions Work, 
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/instit/auctfund/work/work.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
 139 Firms might also attempt to hedge risk by engaging in more unconventional behavior, such 
as purchasing other companies whose success is negatively correlated with their own. For 
instance, imagine that Ford Motor Company is considering making substantial investments in 
designing vehicles powered by natural gas. If executives at Ford fear that greenhouse gas 
regulation could raise the price of natural gas and diminish consumer interest in the cars, they 
might consider purchasing a company that manufactures wind energy turbines as a hedge. Yet 
this option is hardly straightforward. At the limit, it might commit a firm to owning and running 
another company engaged in a completely separate—even diametrically opposed—business. It is 
surely not efficient for executives at an automobile company to manage a wind energy firm. 
Even if nothing more than the purchase of stock were involved, firms still face significant 
hurdles in finding the proper hedge. Imagine that, instead of buying a wind energy corporation, 
Ford instead makes a significant investment in the firm. Ford would now be forced to hedge 
against losses by that company that have nothing to do with greenhouse gas regulation—for 
instance, a general downturn in demand for wind turbines, or an increase in the price of a key 
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2. A Hybrid Proposal 
While we are not optimistic that a market solution exists to the 
problems inhibiting the growth of a regulatory derivatives market, we 
believe that the most promising avenue lies with a hybrid system of 
information markets and insurance. As they currently exist, information 
markets cannot produce sufficient liquidity to serve as effective 
mechanisms for hedging regulatory risk. Yet firms might nonetheless be 
able to employ them as a way of facilitating private first-party insurance. 
Even under conditions of low liquidity, there exist mechanisms for 
generating predictions (and incentivizing investment in accurate forecasts) 
in information markets. Firms can subsidize participation in information 
markets—providing individuals with money that they can use to place bets 
in the market—in order to induce parties with private information to 
participate.140 In the alternative, a sophisticated information market 
employing either a dynamic pari-mutuel design141 or a market scoring 
system142 will, in theory, operate effectively even if only one individual 
participates. These designs can accommodate any trading volume, large or 
small.143 Information markets of these types could turn inputs from even 
small numbers of interested individuals into aggregated predictions, 
assuming that the individuals brought at least small amounts of information 
to the market. If these information markets were viewed as sufficiently 
accurate—a significant caveat, we recognize—insurance companies might 
feel comfortable in pricing regulatory insurance according to their 
 
production input. These hedges might in turn create further risks, which Ford would cover with 
additional investments. This in turn would create further risks, and so forth. In essence, a firm 
would be forced to acquire a highly complex bundle of securities in a quixotic effort to isolate a 
specific business risk. It is thus not surprising that this type of behavior is not widely observed. 
 140 See Abramowicz, supra note 137, at 961–92 (analyzing usefulness of subsidizing 
prediction markets); Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for 
Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1351–53 (2007) (describing process of 
subsidizing corporate prediction markets). Ideally, the relevant governmental policymakers—
agency employees and congressional staff—would be involved, although such efforts might be 
foiled by public corruption and gift laws. See 5 U.S.C. § 7353 (2006) (prohibiting gifts to federal 
employees); 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (federal public corruption law). 
 141 See David M. Pennock, A Dynamic Pari-Mutuel Market for Hedging, Wagering, and 
Information Aggregation, in EC ‘04: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH ACM CONFERENCE ON 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 170, 171–78 (2004) (describing design of pari-mutuel information 
market, which can continuously incorporate information and is highly liquid and risk-free for 
market institutions). 
 142 See Robin Hanson, Combinatorial Information Market Design, 5 INFO. SYS. FRONTIERS 
107, 109–13 (2003) (describing design of market scoring system, which aims to overcome 
incentive problems for information acquisition and sharing). 
 143 See Abramowicz, supra note 137, at 959–60 (describing operation and virtues of market 
scoring systems); Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 140, at 1352–53 (same); Pennock, supra 
note 141, at 171 (describing “infinite liquidity” of pari-mutuel markets). A full description of the 
operation of these types of markets is beyond the scope of this Article. For further discussion, see 
sources cited supra notes 141–143. 
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predictions. The effect would be to bootstrap an extremely large first-party 
insurance market with a small but reliable prediction tool. 
As an initial matter, one might wonder why insurance companies 
would ever believe that an information market was accurate enough to fill a 
pricing function where derivatives markets and the insurers themselves had 
failed. The answer is that information markets might chart a middle course 
between these two high-volume alternatives. As an alternative to internally 
priced insurance, they might be substantially more accurate at predicting 
outcomes than firm experts (as they have proven to be in other contexts).144 
And in comparison to derivatives markets, they might be able to succeed 
with vastly smaller investments of capital. Derivatives markets depend on 
large numbers of firms being willing to invest substantial sums in order to 
provide the liquidity necessary to hedge business risk, and firms likely feel 
far too vulnerable to trade on the information they possess. However, even 
a small, risk-averse cadre of individuals with valuable private information 
and little access to capital could generate reasonable predictions. A 
congressional aide who knows the likely fate of a bill cannot provide 
enough liquidity to allow a major company to hedge its risk, but she might 
be able to orient an information market upon which a major insurer could 
then rely. It is as if insurance firms would be hiring the federal bureaucracy 
for their risk analysis divisions. 
We hasten to add that this suggestion is fraught with other significant 
difficulties. As we note above, it might be impossible for the government 
employees in possession of the best information to participate.145 
Information markets might also be highly subject to manipulation if the 
price of vast quantities of insurance contracts turned on far fewer dollars in 
informational trades.146 And, of course, pricing problems and moral hazard 
issues might simply be insurmountable. Those concerns notwithstanding, 
this hybrid proposal may be the most promising of an unattractive set of 
options, and it would be relatively inexpensive to attempt a small 
experiment. There is thus little reason not to search for further innovative 
solutions.147 
 
 144 See Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 140, at 1346 (reviewing literature on prediction 
markets’ success). 
 145 Nonetheless, it might be interesting to witness the newly incentivized newsgathering by 
Washington, D.C., reporters if such a system were in place. 
 146 Cf. Posting of Jonathan Masur to University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog, 
Strategic Manipulation of the Information Markets, 
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2008/10/just-over-a-wee.html (Oct. 6, 2008, 01:40:13 
PM) (describing potential manipulation of Intrade political markets during 2008 election). 
 147 In addition, a relatively accurate information market could produce other benefits, even if it 
never generated sufficient liquidity to allow firms to hedge. If the market reflected a high 
probability of legal change, firms could respond accordingly in anticipation. The same would be 
true for regulatory insurance, were it to exist. If premiums reflected a high likelihood of 
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Nevertheless, the moribund private market for regulatory insurance 
and derivatives seems unlikely to provide a satisfactory solution to the 
problem of regulatory risk. Having found few promising avenues within the 
private markets, we turn our attention in the next Part to possible 
mechanisms by which the government might provide meaningful transition 
relief. 
IV 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND LEGAL TRANSITION RELIEF 
Based upon the discussion in Parts II and III above, the rise of a 
private market adequate to provide substantial transition relief is unlikely. 
In the absence of a private market for transition relief, the government 
remains a viable option. As we explained in Part I.C, however, there are 
reasons why we would not expect the government to excel at providing 
appropriate transition relief. In particular, the government lacks adequate 
information and is subject to capture and lobbying. Our goal in this Part, 
then, is to consider the institutional structures that will best accentuate the 
government’s advantages and mitigate its shortcomings. 
We proceed in three stages. First, we unbundle the various steps that 
compose transition relief, and we explain how the decisions or 
decisionmaking involved in some of those steps differ from those involved 
in other steps (and from decisions and decisionmaking in the ordinary 
regulatory context). We organize these various steps along a continuum 
ranging from broad, sweeping judgments to narrow, individualized 
determinations. We argue that broad decisions are more likely to involve 
substantial value judgments, while narrow ones are more likely 
technocratic and value-independent. Second, we offer a typology of various 
government actors—the legislature, an executive agency, the judiciary, and 
an independent agency—and discuss the benefits and drawbacks typically 
associated with each institution, with reference to the standard 
considerations of expertise, democratic accountability, and the threat of 
capture. We also explain how many of these benefits and drawbacks may 
have particular prominence in the context of legal transition relief. Third, 
we offer recommendations on institutional structure based on the analysis 
in the first and second Sections. This analysis is necessarily simplified; a 
full consideration of the near-infinite variety (and relative merits) of 
government institutions is well beyond the scope of this Article. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the analysis will allow us to obtain some 
purchase on the question of which type of institutional actor is best 
positioned to decide various questions related to transition relief. 
 
regulation, firms could anticipate legal change. 
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For ease of exposition, we will summarize three important points on 
which our conclusions rest. First, some decisions regarding transition relief 
are more akin to plenary lawmaking. These decisions affect numerous 
societal actors and draw their resolution from broad societal values.148 
Here, one might think of the broad decision of whether transition relief is 
warranted in the first instance. Other decisions are more in the nature of 
applications of an existing legal structure to particular private actors. 
Numerous issues that arise in transition relief settings are highly 
technocratic (as opposed to value-laden) in this sense: for instance, whether 
a modification of an existing structure should subject the structure to 
regulation as if it were new construction;149 whether a transaction was 
consummated before or after the advent of a new legal regime;150 and how 
to allocate limited funds or grandfathering rights.151 
Second, consider the role of expertise in making these narrow, 
technocratic decisions. To be sure, expertise in the particular area of law at 
issue is of some value. But that kind of expertise is often exceeded in value 
by more general expertise in meting out transition relief. Questions that 
arise in these decisions transcend particular areas of law. The question of 
whether a modification should be treated as a new construction arises in 
environmental law,152 land use law,153 and disabilities law,154 to name just a 
few areas. The question of whether a transaction should be deemed 
consummated before or after a legal change takes effect arises in tax law155 
 
 148 Cf. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (holding 
that due process right to direct voice in adoption of policy does not attach to broad legislative 
decisions that affect large swaths of population). 
 149 See, e.g., Nash & Revesz, supra note 2, at 1713–15 (describing how “new source review” 
under Clean Air Act applies where modification to existing facility which otherwise would be 
grandfathered is “substantial”). 
 150 See, e.g., Logue, supra note 7, at 1176–80 (describing difficulty of deciding this question 
in context of changes to tax law). 
 151 See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing 
Marketable Schemes To Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 585 
(2001) [hereinafter Nash & Revesz, Markets and Geography] (describing methods by which 
permits are grandfathered under Clean Air Act’s national sulfur dioxide trading program). 
 152 See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 153 See PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 41.03[4]–[5] (2009) 
(discussing grandfathering in zoning laws). 
 154 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2) (2006) (providing that facility owners shall make 
alterations “to the maximum extent feasible” so that “the path of travel to the altered area and the 
bathrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area[] are readily accessible to 
and usable by individuals with disabilities” but only “where such alterations . . . are not 
disproportionate to the overall alterations in terms of cost and scope” (emphasis added)); 28 
C.F.R. § 36.403(f)(1) (2009) (“Alterations made to provide an accessible path of travel to the 
altered area will be deemed disproportionate to the overall alteration when the cost exceeds 20% 
of the cost of the alteration to the primary function area.”). 
 155 See supra note 150. 
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and bankruptcy law.156 And the question of how to distribute limited funds 
or grandfathering rights arises in environmental law157 and natural 
resources law.158 This strongly suggests that a single government agency 
could accumulate considerable relevant expertise were it charged with 
handling such transition relief decisions across various legal specialties.  
Third, private actors will naturally be willing to invest money and 
time to obtain transition relief, and government actors will face an 
incentive to mete it out in return for private benefits.159 A government actor 
that is charged with distributing transition relief—even in accordance with 
some set legal scheme—likely will enjoy some discretion in making those 
decisions.160 The less that a government body is subject to outside 
influence, the less it will fall prey to private rent-seeking in the allocation 
of transition relief. Accordingly, we conclude that an independent agency 
might be best situated to make some decisions related to the provision and 
application of transition relief. 
A. The Composite Steps of Transition Relief 
Our evaluation of institutional design involves decomposing the 
process of granting legal transition relief into constituent steps. We do this 
for two reasons. First, different steps call for different types of decisions 
and modes of decisionmaking; it may be that some institutional actors are 
better situated to undertake certain steps.161 Second, in order to establish 
some checks on any one actor’s authority (and thus at least to raise the cost 
of successful lobbying), it may be desirable to vest different actors with 
authority over different parts of the process. 
There are several steps in the process of granting transition relief. The 
first is the determination of whether there is any justification sufficient to 
warrant granting transition relief. Assuming some transition relief is found 
 
 156 See, e.g., Stephen W. Sather, The Great Bankruptcy Rush of 2005 and Its Aftermath: The 
View from Texas, AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV., Sept. 2006, at 34, 34 (“[T]he signing of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 . . . set off a massive rush to 
the bankruptcy courts.”). 
 157 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 158 See generally Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty, supra note 7 (discussing methods of 
allocating finite natural resources). 
 159 See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of capture in 
transition relief context). 
 160 Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001) (rejecting argument 
that directive requiring agency to set standard to protect public health failed to provide 
“intelligible principle” against which to gauge agency action, thus indicating that legislative 
delegation was proper). 
 161 Cf. B. Timothy Heinmiller, The Politics of “Cap and Trade” Policies, 47 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 445, 449–51 (2007) (breaking process of implementing cap-and-trade emissions 
allowance regime into three steps—setting cap, allocating allowances, and then permitting 
trading—and noting that each step raises distinct political pressures and concerns). 
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to be appropriate, the second step is to decide what form transition relief 
will assume. A third step is to determine who will in fact be entitled to 
relief and who will not. 
We unpack these steps in the following subsections. In doing so, we 
describe the steps involved in transition relief along a continuum ranging 
from broad, sweeping choices to narrow, individualized decisions. The 
former category is associated with developing a rule; the latter with simply 
applying a rule that already has been crafted. Decisionmaking of the former 
type is likely to be heavily value-laden—that is, to turn upon normative 
values and political choices—while decisionmaking of the latter type is 
likely to be more technocratic.162 This stylized approach, of course, 
represents a significant oversimplification of the nuances of regulatory 
decisionmaking, and we do not mean to claim that this is the best or only 
way of conceptualizing the processes involved in transition relief. We 
believe only that viewing the steps involved in transition relief through this 
lens sheds substantial light on the institutional actors best positioned to 
manage its various aspects.163 
1. Deciding Whether Transition Relief Is Warranted 
The step of deciding whether transition relief is warranted—in 
keeping with the general aversion to transition relief discussed above in 
Part I.A and based upon the criteria justifying transition relief that we 
identified above in Part I.B—is not dissimilar from the issues that confront 
the legislature and regulators in structuring the new legal regime itself. 
First, the decisions are heavily value-laden.164 Questions of legitimacy165 
and fairness166 are quite common in developing a new legal regime, as is 
 
 162 See supra notes 148–151 and accompanying text. 
 163 In addition, we acknowledge that merely because we can disaggregate the constituent steps 
of affording transition relief does not mean in practice that government actors in fact divide the 
process in this way, or that responsibility for the steps is divvied up among multiple actors. For 
example, the first phase of the sulfur dioxide emissions allowance trading program under the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 involved Congress deciding (i) that allowances would be 
distributed via grandfathering, (ii) exactly which industrial plants would receive allowances, and 
(iii) exactly how many allowances each plant would receive. See Lisa Heinzerling, Selling 
Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300, 328–32 (1995) (discussing evidence 
of groups influencing Congress in establishing Clean Air program); Paul L. Joskow & Richard 
Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain 
Program, 41 J.L. & ECON. 37, 51–58 (1998) (same); Nash & Revesz, Markets and Geography, 
supra note 151, at 585 (summarizing initial allowance allocation). Some existing practices, of 
course, may not be normatively desirable. Our point is simply that disaggregation allows us to 
consider what distributions of responsibility would be normatively preferable. 
 164 See, e.g., Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343, 352 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing 
value of transition relief). 
 165 See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text (discussing legitimacy as possible 
justification for transition relief). 
 166 See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text (discussing fairness as possible justification 
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the issue of the extent to which the new regime may affect the behavior of 
societal actors, perhaps especially with respect to investment decisions.167 
Indeed, even the decision of whether to grant transition relief and secure 
the new legal regime, or to deny it and thus catalyze opposition to the new 
regime, is itself heavily value-laden.168 Accordingly, decisionmaking as to 
whether transition relief is warranted is best characterized as broad rather 
than narrow. The decision is at a high enough level of generality that it 
avoids confronting specific questions as to whether particular actors will 
get relief and what form that relief will take. 
2. Deciding upon the Form and Quantity of Transition Relief 
Once a decision has been reached to offer some transition relief, the 
next step is to consider how much relief is to be offered and the form in 
which it is to be offered. The answer to the second question may affect the 
first: If the government uses cash to pay directly at least some people who 
used to engage in the activity, then the question of how much relief there 
will be reduces to the amount of funds that will be made available. On the 
other hand, if the government grandfathers rights, then the government may 
decide to cap expressly the total extent to which actors might use the 
grandfathering rights—that is, to cap the total amount of grandfathered 
activity allowed going forward—or it might decide simply to limit the total 
number of actors who receive grandfathered rights (with any such actor 
free to engage in the prior behavior as much as he or she would like), thus 
limiting the total amount of grandfathered activity only indirectly. 
Whether the government conveys relief under a cap-and-trade system, 
under a grandfathering regime, or by means of compensation, there is a 
strongly value-laden core decision concerning the acceptable amount of the 
regulated activity that should be allowed to continue—or the appropriate 
amount of money to compensate those barred from previously acceptable 
activity.169 These types of decisions will inevitably involve tradeoffs 
between government priorities, and between economic concerns and other 
considerations (such as health and safety) that the regulation was meant to 
address in the first instance. Because of the incentive effects created by 
transition relief, every decision either to provide or withhold such relief—
 
for transition relief). 
 167 See supra notes 24–34 and accompanying text (discussing investment incentives as 
possible justification for transition relief). 
 168 See Levmore, supra note 7, at 1665–67 (discussing tradeoffs involved in decision to 
compensate politically powerful losers when enacting new regulatory scheme). 
 169 Cf. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 49, at 1353 (lauding tradable pollution permit regimes 
over command-and-control regimes to achieve environmental goals on ground that former 
regimes vest important decision of how much overall pollution should be allowed with 
legislature, thus enhancing democracy); Sunstein, Administrative Substance, supra note 49, at 
636 (same); Sunstein, Democratizing America, supra note 49, at 967 (same). 
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and decisions as to the form it will take—will influence both the reach of 
the regulatory program (and thus its effects) and the economic impact on 
private parties. 
As an example, consider a decision to limit emissions of a pollutant 
using a cap-and-trade system.170 A higher total emissions cap will lead to a 
smaller environmental impact but a smaller economic impact as well. On 
the other hand, a lower emissions cap will induce greater environmental 
protection at the cost of a greater economic burden. The impact, in terms of 
both environmental protection and economics, may also vary across time: 
Some cap-and-trade programs are designed to phase out particular 
emissions and thus have caps that progressively decrease on a yearly 
basis,171 but many programs simply put in place a cap that persists for many 
years.172 Alternatively, transition relief in the form of cash transfers to 
affected firms would not substantially diminish the impact of pollution caps 
or alter the behavior of private parties, but it would drain the government 
fisc.173 Choosing between different types of transition relief structures thus 
requires tradeoffs among a wide variety of public policy considerations. 
3. Deciding Who Gets Transition Relief 
Decisions as to who should receive transition relief fall into two 
categories: broader decisions as to the inclusion or exclusion of classes of 
recipients and narrower case-by-case decisions that determine the ultimate 
allocation of transition relief. No matter what the form of transition relief, 
questions as to which classes of actors should receive relief will arise. For 
example, programs that protect fisheries by capping annual fishing catches 
raise questions as to whether fishing boat owners alone, or, in addition, 
those who work on the boats, should receive individual fishing quotas.174 
 
 170 In a cap-and-trade system, the government caps the total acceptable amount (over a period 
of time, usually a year) of behavior that the new legal regime otherwise outlaws. It then divides 
that total cap among a number that it distributes to societal actors, who then may trade them. 
Nash, supra note 47, at 321. Each permit authorizes its holder to engage in a set amount of the 
restricted behavior, and only those with permits may engage in the behavior at all. Id. 
 171 The EPA’s tradable permits program, though not technically an emissions regulation 
program, phased out the use of lead in gasoline during the 1980s. See Nash, supra note 49, at 
488–89. 
 172 See Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving Toward 
Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 407 (2009) (describing cap employed by Chicago 
Emissions Reduction Market System). 
 173 Cf. supra note 59. 
 174 See Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343 (9th Cir. 1996) (adjudicating litigation 
challenging allocation of fisheries quotas). In Alliance, the court considered a challenge by 
workers that the council’s allocation of quota shares to owners and lessees but not workers was 
not, as the governing statute required, “fair and equitable.” See id. at 348 (quoting 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1851(a)(4)(A) (2006)). Though it described the argument as “sensible,” id., the court proceeded 
to reject the argument on two grounds. First, the statute did not make the “fair and equitable” 
requirement the sole criteria with which the council had to comply. See id. at 348–49. Second, the 
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Similarly, if the government uses compensation to effect transition relief, 
should boat owners alone—or more generally those with capital 
investments—receive compensation, or should the government also make 
payments to those who work on the boats? Should transition relief be 
limited to firms who suffer directly under a new legal regime,175 or should 
employees176 or consumers receive some sort of relief as well? And of 
course there may be questions as to which particular actors within these 
groups should receive transition relief. These questions are narrower and 
more individualized than the decisions we have discussed to this point. 
Put another way, the remaining task is to allocate the amount of 
transition relief authorized among those actors whom the government has 
designated as possible recipients. This allocation task generally will be 
fairly technocratic: It will involve allocating transition relief according to 
general directives that already have been established. Because it involves 
final decisions as to winners and losers, the allocation task is almost certain 
to invite substantial lobbying and capture efforts—perhaps even more than 
attend other stages in the process.177 In these senses, the analysis required 
here will differ fundamentally from the other decisions that we have 
described. 
Each of the three component steps that we identify could in theory be 
undertaken by a different government actor: the legislature, an executive 
branch agency, the judiciary, or an independent agency. In each of the 
 
council’s logic that owners and lessees have put capital at risk and thus deserve quota shares was 
sound: “The Secretary thought that the problem of overfishing resulted more from investment in 
boats than occupational choices of fishermen, so the administrative remedy should be measured 
by ownership and leasing of boats.” Id. at 349. 
 175 In the context of international trade agreements, “safeguards relief” provisions provide 
loopholes that countries may invoke when a domestic industry is put in a precarious economic 
position by the implementation of a new trade accord. For discussion, see, for example, Alan O. 
Sykes, The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons from the Steel Dispute, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
523, 526–38 (2004) (describing provisions in international trade agreements and as implemented 
under U.S. law and discussing how such provisions work). 
 176 For example, trade adjustment assistance programs provide protection to those who suffer 
disemployment by virtue of new free trade agreements. See 19 U.S.C. § 2271(a) (2006) 
(establishing mechanism by which adversely affected workers may apply for relief); Paul T. 
Decker & Walter Corson, International Trade and Worker Displacement: Evaluation of the 
Trade Adjustment Assistance Program, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 758, 759–60 (1995) 
(providing overview of Trade Adjustment Assistance program); see also Joskow & Schmalensee, 
supra note 163, at 50 (describing controversy over Byrd Amendment to 1990 Clean Air Act that 
would have provided benefits to coal mine employees who lost their jobs); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., 
The Legislative History of U.S. Air Pollution Control, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 679, 721–22 (1999) 
(same). 
 177 See Heinmiller, supra note 161, at 457 (“Considering the high stakes nature of the 
allocation process, users and potential users are strongly motivated to protect their essential self-
interests, so the allocation process is best understood as a distributive conflict between rival user 
groups presided over by governmental regulators . . . . [R]ival users . . . are typically multiple and 
highly fragmented.”). 
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succeeding subsections, we consider the benefits and drawbacks associated 
with each such government actor. We continue to assume (a) that private 
insurance is unavailable, and (b) that either Congress or an executive 
branch agency has seen fit to enact a new legal regime.178 
B. Government Actors 
We turn now to consideration of the potential government managers 
of transition relief. There is, of course, an extensive literature on the 
comparative advantages of legislatures, courts, and agencies,179 and we 
intend to rely upon it here. In so doing, we assess the suitability of 
government actors as providers of transition relief along familiar 
administrative metrics, including expertise, political accountability, and 
susceptibility to capture. In particular, we consider the strengths and 
weaknesses of various institutional actors with reference to the broad and 
 
 178 The legislative and executive branches are not the only branches of government that may 
promulgate a new legal regime. When a court announces a new decision, that announcement itself 
may raise questions of legal transition relief. See infra notes 196–198 and accompanying text. 
This type of setting lies beyond the scope of this Article for several reasons. First, courts 
announcing a new interpretation of law may believe, alternatively, that they are actually 
announcing a “new rule” of law, or simply that they are “clarifying” preexisting law. The latter 
case presumably does not raise questions of transition relief. Second, to the extent that a court 
decision may have retroactive application, it traditionally has been the court itself that determines 
the retroactive effect of its ruling. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100 
(1993) (finding prior ruling to have retroactive effect and rejecting state court’s ruling on issue of 
retroactivity). Indeed, efforts by other branches to dictate retroactive effects of laws on court 
decisions have met with court disapproval on separation of powers grounds. See Plaut v. 
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 217–19 (1995) (declaring unconstitutional congressional 
attempt to use new, extended statute of limitations to open cases already dismissed under old 
statute of limitations and now-final judgments). But cf. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029 
(2008) (holding that state courts were free to apply new constitutional rule of criminal procedure 
retroactively even where federal courts would not). Third, settings where courts announce new 
rules of law lie beyond the paradigmatic “new legal regime” setting with which we are concerned 
in this Article: We are interested here in settings where there is a new, broad legal regime 
affecting numerous actors. Courts rarely announce such regimes and, to the extent they do so, it is 
usually a matter of consequence, not design. 
 179 See generally Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of 
Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1327–33 (1999) (arguing for complete abandonment of 
judicial review of agency rulemaking); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the 
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 592–98 (1985) (concluding that courts should defer 
to agencies where Congress has endowed agencies with significant policymaking responsibility); 
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 467–526 (1989) (arguing that judicial deference to agencies is 
unconstitutional); Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: 
Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1049–
70 (2006) (arguing that agencies tend to be consistent across issues but variable over time, while 
courts tend to be consistent across time but variable across issues, and that Congress should take 
these features into account in structuring delegations); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and 
Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 522–29 
(evaluating costs and benefits of courts as legal authority). 
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narrow questions of transition relief detailed above. No government actor 
will be the perfect decisionmaker at every step. Our undertaking here is 
simply to identify comparative advantages among those institutions that 
may render some institutions preferable in certain contexts. 
1. The Legislature 
Congress is designed to be a democratic actor,180 accountable to the 
electorate.181 The legislature is thus well positioned to make broad, value-
laden judgments, and in particular, to assess claims that the government 
should afford transition relief on grounds of fairness or legitimacy. At the 
same time, there are disadvantages to vesting control over legal transition 
relief with Congress. First, Congress may act not in the public good, but 
rather to obtain rents.182 This is especially problematic in the context of 
legal transition relief, given the extent to which such relief is often the 
product of rent-seeking. Thus, for example, commentators have explained 
how Congress’s monopoly over the allocation of grandfathered sulfur 
dioxide emissions allowances under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
led to substantial, and successful, rent-seeking.183 As discussed above, the 
incentive for rent-seeking may be greater with respect to individualized 
decisions with clear winners and losers.184 
Second, procedural hurdles—such as committee consideration, 
filibusters, and vetoes—make enacting legislation slow and cumbersome. 
This feature may facilitate interest groups’ ability to obtain transition relief, 
even where it may not be warranted. To the extent that an interest group 
 
 180 Cf. supra note 169 (identifying commentators who advocate, on grounds of democratic 
accountability, congressional determination of caps in cap-and-trade pollution programs). 
 181 For a critical examination, see Jane S. Schacter, Digitally Democratizing Congress? 
Technology and Political Accountability, 89 B.U. L. REV. 641, 643–48 (2009), which questions 
whether Congress is as accountable as it could be. 
 182 See, e.g., Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins, The Choice of 
Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 322–25 (1998) 
(describing legislation as product of supply by legislators and demand by special interests); Saul 
Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421, S425–29 
(2002) (describing argument that property systems are designed to benefit well-organized interest 
groups); Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 280–81 
(describing argument that legislation tends to be designed to reward politically powerful groups). 
 183 See Heinzerling, supra note 163, at 328–32 (explaining that much of allocation of 
emissions allowances under national sulfur dioxide trading program established under 1990 
amendments to Clean Air Act was attributable to rent-seeking); Joskow & Schmalensee, supra 
note 163, at 51–58 (same). 
 184 See supra note 177 and accompanying text. Congress’s freedom to pass laws on an 
individualized basis is also limited. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 
1226–27 (11th Cir. 2005) (alluding to, without resolving, possible unconstitutionality of 
congressional statute designed to change legal standards to benefit particular plaintiff in 
individual case); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1272–75 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(Birch, J., specially concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that statute was 
unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds). 
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can credibly threaten to block legislation—and procedural hurdles can 
make these threats easier to maintain—we can expect interest groups to 
obtain the rents they seek more frequently. This problem is exacerbated by 
the fact that Congress is often the body that has produced the new legal 
regime in the first instance. Interested parties can thus threaten to hold up 
the underlying regime change until Congress guarantees their relief from 
the transition. 
Third, it is likely that Congress as a whole is not expert in the area 
governed by the new legal regime, or with respect to societal actors 
impacted by the regime. Indeed, even congressional staffers are unlikely to 
enjoy such expertise.185 To the extent, then, that expertise will improve a 
decisionmaking process, Congress is not the optimal branch in which to 
vest authority to engage in that process. 
2. An Executive Branch Agency 
The principal advantage of delegating to an agency is the gain in 
expertise.186 This expertise will presumably be of less importance in the 
context of legal transition relief than it is in structuring primary 
regulation.187 Still, an agency’s expertise might be of some help in 
formulating the precise structure of transition relief, and also perhaps in 
deciding which classes of actors might appropriately be afforded transition 
relief. 
At the same time, executive branch agencies188 remain accountable to 
some degree to the elected members of the legislature and the executive, 
and thus to the public.189 This accountability is not as powerful as for a 
directly elected body such as the legislature,190 but nonetheless, executive 
agencies are frequently trusted to make broad, value-laden judgments. For 
example, many environmental statutes vest the EPA with significant 
 
 185 See, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 116, at 1959 (stating that, as compared to agency 
staff, congressional staffs lack substantive expertise and professional connections). 
 186 See, e.g., id. (noting expertise of agency staff in comparison to congressional committee 
staff members); William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and 
the Quest for Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521, 1543 
(2009) (noting great expertise of federal regulators as first movers in their respective areas). 
 187 Cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law 
Products Liability Claims, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 445 (2009) (identifying state law’s conflict 
with “federal regulatory framework” as area that “might fall outside the expertise of the agency”). 
 188 We employ this terminology not to distinguish between agencies such as the EPA and 
cabinet-level agencies such as the Department of Labor, but to distinguish between agencies 
under the control of the President (“executive branch” agencies) and independent agencies. The 
latter are discussed below. 
 189 See Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency 
Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1068–91 (2001) (describing and assessing executive and legislative 
oversight of agency rulemaking). 
 190 Id. at 1091–93. 
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policymaking authority.191 However, the threat of capture by regulated 
parties accompanies accountability, much as it does for Congress.192 
3. The Judiciary 
We traditionally associate two benefits with judicial decisionmaking. 
First, judicial independence insulates courts from capture by, and bias for 
or against, the parties appearing before them.193 Second, deliberation 
among panels of judges and among courts enhances the quality of 
decisions.194 
On the other hand, courts generally are not accountable for their 
individual decisions, as greater independence begets less accountability.195 
Similarly, courts are very unlikely to have field-specific expertise. Nor will 
judges typically be familiar with even general issues surrounding transition 
relief. To be sure, the judiciary often must confront its own questions of 
legal transition relief—whether to apply new decisions retroactively196 and 
whether to abrogate the precedential effect of an earlier decision. But 
retroactivity is not usually the primary issue in a case; courts generally rule 
on retroactivity as a subsidiary issue after they have resolved the principal 
question on the merits. Indeed, courts usually resort to set rules197 rather 
than policy considerations—such as efficiency concerns—in resolving 
retroactivity questions.198 Moreover, courts lack an opportunity to gather 
information beyond what is submitted by the parties who appear before 
them.199 This further exacerbates the judiciary’s deficits in information and 
 
 191 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (upholding congressional 
delegation to EPA of authority to set standard requisite to protect public health). 
 192 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1039, 1064–67 (1997) (noting judicial awareness of risks of agency capture). 
 193 See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2168, 2171 
(2006) (noting that “independence frees judges to make unpopular decisions”); Jonathan Remy 
Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived 
Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1752 (2008) (same). 
 194 See Adeno Addis & Jonathan Remy Nash, Identitarian Anxieties and the Nature of Inter-
tribunal Deliberations, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 613, 615–17 (2009) (discussing judicial deliberation); 
Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1639, 1644–70 (2003) (discussing judicial collegiality). 
 195 See Nash, supra note 193, at 2171 (characterizing judicial independence and judicial 
accountability as “competing demands upon the judiciary”). 
 196 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Legal Defeasibility in Context and the Emergence of Substantial 
Indefeasibility, in ESSAYS ON LEGAL DEFEASIBILITY (Jordi Ferrer & Giovanni B. Ratti eds., 
forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 22–26, on file with the New York University Law Review) 
(discussing retroactive application of new rules in context of post-conviction habeas 
proceedings). 
 197 See Jill E. Fisch, The Implications of Transition Theory for Stare Decisis, 13 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 93, 97–105 (2003) (describing common law rules regarding stare decisis). 
 198 See id. at 105–06 (“[A] merit-based analysis appears insensitive to the values inherent in 
the system of stare decisis.”). 
 199 See, e.g., Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for 
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expertise. 
4. Independent Agencies 
Independent agencies200 present benefits and downsides similar to 
those offered by courts. The raison d’être of independent agencies is, of 
course, their relative independence from the executive branch201 and thus 
from the effects of interest group lobbying and rent-seeking.202 This 
independence is hardly complete, however. Though independent agencies 
as entities are not accountable to any political actor, individual members of 
an agency may be subject to personal or political pressure via direct 
lobbying. It is not uncommon for employees (or even heads) of 
independent agencies to leave government service for lucrative 
employment in the private sector based on relationships forged during time 
in the government.203 Accordingly, even independent agency employees 
understand that they often face significant personal incentives to decide 
regulatory questions in one direction or another. Nonetheless, independent 
agencies have frequently been trusted with highly politically sensitive 
 
Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 371–72 (1984) (describing courts’ limited ability 
to regulate effectively due to information deficit and lack of control over agenda). 
 200 For an overview of the theory and structure of independent agencies, see generally 
Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of 
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1135–63 (2000). 
 201 See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, The Debate over Independent Agencies in Light of Empirical 
Evidence, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215, 218 (noting that independent agencies are more shielded from 
executive branch influence than are traditional executive branch agencies). While administrators 
of independent agencies do not enjoy life tenure, still they enjoy some degree of independence by 
virtue of their extended terms in office and limits on their removability. Cf. Lisa Schultz 
Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence (Vanderbilt Univ. Law 
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 10-01, Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & 
Econ. Working Paper No. 10-02, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1546103 (arguing 
that rise of hybrid independent-executive mechanisms decreases independent agency freedom 
from presidential influence, but noting that decreased autonomy may also productively increase 
accountability); Nash & Pardo, supra note 193, at 1765–69 (arguing that, notwithstanding their 
lack of life tenure, bankruptcy judges nonetheless enjoy considerable degree of judicial 
independence). 
 202 See Buzbee, supra note 186, at 1527 (finding that executive actors are subject to lobbying 
by interest groups on regulatory matters); Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of 
Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 259–60 (noting that statutory requirement of 
bipartisanship is designed to isolate independent regulatory agencies from political pressure). For 
commentary questioning the extent of the independence enjoyed by independent agencies, see 
generally Symposium, The Independence of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215; and 
compare Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 
U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1147–53 (1990), which argues that even specialized courts that review 
agency action may develop an agency bias. For discussion of protections designed to frustrate 
independent agency bias and to ensure political independence, see Breger & Edles, supra note 
200, at 1188–97. 
 203 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 86–87 
(1969) (describing intention of many FTC lawyers to use their experience as means of obtaining 
lucrative private sector job after public service). 
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decisions, often to good effect.204 At the same time, the tradeoff for this 
independence is a comparative lack of democratic accountability; by 
design, independent agencies are not responsive to broader public moods or 
values.205 This may make independent agencies ill-suited for broad, value-
laden judgments of the type that come early in the process of choosing a 
scheme of regulation or transition relief. 
At the same time, independent agencies do have the opportunity to 
develop some degree of expertise.206 Like any other administrative agency, 
an independent agency can hire staff with technical skill and can explore 
complicated policy issues to a degree impossible in a court or, to a lesser 
extent, Congress.207 Independent agencies possess all of the procedural 
advantages of an administrative actor: the ability to conduct studies and 
accumulate data, the power to take comments from interested parties, the 
authority to hold hearings, and so forth.208 A wide variety of independent 
federal agencies have acquired strong reputations for technical 
competence.209 Independent agencies might thus be well-suited to resolving 
individualized decisions, such as the allocation of transition relief among 
eligible parties.210 
 
 204 For example, consider the use of independent commissions to recommend military base 
closures. See Natalie Hanlon, Military Base Closings: A Study of Government by Commission, 62 
U. COLO. L. REV. 331, 333–40 (1991). 
 205 For discussion of independent agency accountability and autonomy as competing interests, 
see Breger & Edles, supra note 200, at 1198–1209. For recent scholarship advocating increased 
reliance on independent agencies, see Bressman & Thompson, supra note 201, at 3, which argues 
that reliance on independent agencies may allow presidential oversight “sufficient to satisfy 
political interests and to serve normative values,” and Roberta S. Karmel, The Controversy over 
Systemic Risk Regulation, BROOK. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1540691, which argues that an independent agency should regulate 
systemic financial risk. Recent legislative proposals have also drawn upon independent agencies 
as valuable institutional actors. For discussion of the role of independent agencies in recent health 
care and global warming legislative proposals, see id. at 46–55. 
Note that some independent actors may be temporary (like a one-time commission to select 
which military bases to close), while others may be permanent (like the SEC). We advocate here 
a permanent agency; an agency with permanence can gather expertise over time. Cf. Adrian 
Vermeule, Intermittent Institutions (Harvard Law School Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working 
Paper Group, Paper No. 10-13, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542104 
(highlighting differences between temporary and permanent governmental institutions and 
explaining when each type of actor might be more appropriate). 
 206 The type of expertise that would be relevant here is discussed infra notes 222–224 and 
accompanying text. 
 207 See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 202, at 262–63 (noting that independent agencies develop 
expertise over time). 
 208 This depends of course on the agency’s organic statute, but most independent agencies 
possess this type of power (and there is no reason Congress could not confer it if necessary). 
 209 See, e.g., Michael J. Borden, The Role of Financial Journalists in Corporate Governance, 
12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 311, 354–55 (2007) (noting superlative regulatory expertise of 
SEC). 
 210 Cf. Verkuil, supra note 202, at 267–72 (providing examples to show independent agencies 
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Table 1 summarizes the distinctive features of the various government 
actors we have examined in this Section. 
TABLE 1 
COMPARING THE FEATURES OF INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS 
 
Armed with (or able 
to develop) relevant 
expertise? 
Prone to lobbying 
and capture? 
Good at making 
narrow, 
technocratic 
decisions? 
Good at making 
broad, value-laden 
decisions? 
 
No Very Not good Very good Congress 
Yes Very Very good Good 
Executive Branch 
Agency 
No No Very good Not good Court 
Yes Somewhat Very good Not good Independent Agency 
C. Recommendations 
The previous Section demonstrated that different institutional actors 
offer different benefits within a system designed to apportion legal 
transition relief. This differentiation suggests that an optimal allocation of 
power with respect to legal transition relief would enlist multiple 
institutional actors.211 Vesting all authority over transition relief with the 
same actor that has responsibility for shaping the new legal regime likely 
will result in the transition relief contaminating (or at least threatening to 
contaminate) the new legal regime itself. While this may be unavoidable at 
some level, vesting all authority in one entity may make it genuinely 
impossible to enact a new legal regime without finishing all bargaining 
over the scope of transition relief. That, in turn, may serve to increase the 
amount of lobbying that attends the structuring of new legal regimes, as 
 
are best used in functions that mirror appellate courts, not to administer set policies). 
 211 A prominent analogy to the separation of decisionmaking authority between entities for 
purposes of providing transition relief appears in the context of environmental risk regulation. 
There, “risk assessment” (the determination of whether a risk exists and its scope) is separated 
from “risk management” (the policy question of how to respond to the risk identified). See 
Jonathan Remy Nash, High-Speed Police Chases and the Constitutional Common Law of Risk 
Regulation (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University Law Review) 
(discussing environmental risk assessment and management). One justification for this separation 
is specialization: Risk assessment raises questions best addressed by experts in science, while risk 
management introduces questions best addressed by policy and economic experts. See id. at 7–8. 
Another justification is that separation of inquiry avoids the very real risk that policymakers 
would otherwise infect, and even overwhelm, the control of scientific experts over risk 
assessment. See id. at 8 (discussing how separation of risk management from risk assessment 
protects integrity of risk assessment). Put another way, the separation of risk management from 
risk assessment helps to ensure the propriety and validity of the entire process. 
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private parties exploit the opportunity to delay the new regime in order to 
extract transition relief. 
We return here to the three categories of justifications for transition 
relief that we described in Part I: “political” justifications, “legitimacy” 
justifications, and “economic” justifications. In light of these justifications, 
we suggest which institutional actors might be best equipped to make 
decisions at each of the various stages in the provision of transition relief. 
1. Political Considerations 
Where Congress or the executive can impose a new legal regime only 
if it pays off interested private parties through transition relief, that relief 
will necessarily be a part of the construction of the legal regime itself.212 By 
hypothesis, affected private parties will not permit Congress or the 
executive to proceed with legal change unless they are confident that they 
will receive the desired transition relief, which in many cases will require 
that the transition relief be built into the legal regime in finished form. 
Thus, in many cases, whichever governmental body creates the new legal 
regime in the first instance (Congress, an agency, or the courts) will be 
forced to provide transition relief at the same moment. 
In other cases, however, the original law or regulation need only 
include some promise of transition relief, and not a detailed recitation of 
which party will receive what benefit. In these instances, the original 
lawmaking body might be able to leave consideration of the exact form and 
recipients of transition relief to an outside actor, such as an agency or 
court.213 One might ask why a group of private actors with enough power to 
block enactment of the new legal regime, and thus presumably with enough 
power to extract concessions on legal transition relief, would not demand 
that Congress specifically allocate such relief. One answer may be that the 
group is confident that the transition relief that will eventually be offered 
will be satisfactory. Another answer is that the group might believe that 
explicit congressional assurance will appear too crass and harm its interests 
in the long run.214 This may also explain why Congress would voluntarily 
forgo its apparent ability to extract even higher rents from a group in a 
position to deliver them.215 In the end, however, questions of who is best 
 
 212 See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing circumstances in which transition relief will be 
necessary). 
 213 We return to the question of which outside actors will be best suited to this task infra Part 
IV.C.3. 
 214 See Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty, supra note 7, at 842–43 (arguing that grandfathered 
rights are popular because they disguise publicly unpopular cost-benefit calculus). 
 215 See id. at 843 (arguing that government choice of transition relief is driven by desire to 
create “perception of procedural fairness”). This concern, however, seems not to have stopped 
Congress from literally listing the number of free sulfur dioxide allowances being allocated to 
coal-fired power plants under the Clean Air Act sulfur dioxide trading program. That method of 
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positioned to provide transition relief from a technocratic point of view are 
largely inapposite. If transition relief is politically necessary to secure 
adoption of a new legal regime, in nearly all cases it must be provided by 
the political actor associated with the regime itself. 
2. Legitimacy Considerations 
If the rationale for affording transition relief is the fear that people will 
perceive a new legal regime as illegitimate or unfair, then a political 
actor—and most likely the body that creates the new legal regime—is best 
positioned to make decisions regarding transition relief. In many cases this 
will be Congress itself; in other cases an agency will play this role. The 
choice of actor will be driven in large part by the question of which 
institution is best positioned to gauge both which parties might object on 
grounds of fairness and what steps need be taken to alleviate their concerns. 
Congress, as the institution most directly accountable to the voters, is the 
natural choice. 
Again, however, it may only be necessary for Congress to indicate a 
desire to afford some transition relief without spelling out the precise form 
or recipients of that relief. A general statement of transition rights, coupled 
with an opportunity to be heard in front of a neutral judicial or 
administrative body, will in many cases be sufficient. 
More generally, whether the legislature, an executive branch actor, or 
an independent agency actor makes decisions regarding transition relief, 
judicial review can perform a useful constraining function. While the courts 
are poorly designed to make such decisions in the first instance, their 
independence renders them potentially valuable as a backstop. To the 
extent that either executive branch actors or independent agencies resolve 
questions of transition relief pursuant to a congressional delegation of 
authority, judicial review should be available to ensure both that (1) the 
general format and structure of transition relief conforms to the delegation 
of authority; and (2) individual decisions as to transition relief are made 
appropriately under the prescribed format and structure. Existing 
administrative law provides ample basis for both of these types of review. 
3. Economic Considerations 
When transition relief is called for because the attendant benefits 
outweigh the social costs associated with such relief,216 or to induce certain 
 
explicit allocation, however, persisted only under the initial, time-limited first phase of the trading 
program; the broader second phase allocates allowances by formula. Nash & Revesz, Markets 
and Geography, supra note 151, at 584–85. 
 216 See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances where balance of 
social costs favors transition relief). 
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desirable investments,217 the decision of what transition relief to afford is 
largely a technocratic one. Here, the multiple steps involved in the decision 
to provide transition relief are significant. As we have explained above, the 
initial decisions regarding whether to provide transition relief, and to a 
lesser extent the form and quantity of relief to provide, are often quite 
broad in scope and can involve a series of value judgments and tradeoffs 
between priorities. In this respect, Congress, or a politically accountable 
executive branch agency, would appear best situated to render the relevant 
decision. 
However, when it comes to the particular decisions about what shape 
transition relief should take and which particular parties should be entitled 
to it, the picture changes. Congress appears poorly positioned to make these 
narrow, individualized, technocratic judgments, or at least less well 
positioned than a more expert agency. Thus, as a general matter, it would 
make sense for Congress to delegate judgments such as these.218 There is 
historical precedent for this approach: At times Congress has seen fit to 
authorize transition relief but leave the details to other actors with closer 
ties to affected communities and populations. For example, in an effort to 
preserve fisheries, Congress has vested executive branch actors and 
regionally elected fishery councils with the authority to distribute 
grandfathered fishing rights equitably.219 
Not only will an agency often be superior to Congress in the allocation 
of transition relief, but an independent agency may be even better situated 
than a standard executive branch administrator. Once the decision to grant 
such relief has been made, expert actors who are as independent of political 
influence as possible should determine the structure and recipients of the 
relief in order to diminish rent-seeking to the greatest extent feasible.220 An 
 
 217 See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text (noting suggestions of how transition relief 
may be used to incentivize socially desirable investments). 
 218 Michael Graetz has argued that deciding who should receive transition relief is difficult 
because the effects of a change in the law may have an impact beyond simply the class of people 
directly affected by the law. See Graetz, supra note 59, at 77–78. As an example, Graetz explains 
that revision of air transportation regulations might “have financial effects on the investors, 
consumers and employees of air carriers, airframe manufacturers, and airport operators.” Id. at 
78. The fact that so many classes of societal actors might be affected may make it challenging, if 
not impossible, to apportion limited but appropriate transition relief. Presumably, an expert 
agency would handle such challenges better. And if indeed the task proves to be impossible, an 
expert agency would be best positioned to come to that conclusion as quickly as possible. 
 219 See Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty, supra note 7 at 819–20 (describing reliance on 
regional fishery councils in development of fishing quota systems). 
 220 To the extent that compensation is used, the legislature or executive branch agency should 
set a cap on the total amount of available relief. Cf. Michael B. Gerrard, N.Y. Brownfields 
Program Buffeted by Legislature, Courts, N.Y. L.J., July 25, 2008, at 5 (describing how, where 
brownfields cleanup program authorized tax credits far in excess of actual cleanup costs, New 
York State’s Department of Environmental Conservation “began making it difficult for sites to 
enter” program in order “[t]o guard the state’s treasury from this uncapped exposure”). 
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independent agency meets these criteria perhaps better than any other 
standard government institution.221 
This independent agency could of course be the institution that created 
the new legal regime, as when the SEC promulgates a new regulation. Or it 
could be a stand-alone institution created by Congress to administer 
transition relief related to a single law, similar to the Base Closing 
Commission.222 But Congress could also create an independent agency 
dedicated to allocating transition relief across a wide range of substantive 
legal areas. That agency might acquire or be imbued with expertise related 
to transition relief that transcends particular legal subjects. For example, 
many statutes require consideration of whether a modification to a 
grandfathered structure is “substantial.” Again, this type of question arises 
with respect to environmental law, land use law, and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, among other legal regimes.223 An agency might become 
skilled at drawing workable lines related to “substantial” modification 
across issue areas. It is also possible that the breadth and number of 
regulated entities who would come before the agency would again narrow 
the possibility of capture.224 
For instance, consider tax law. As things now stand, taxpayers who 
see new tax legislation on the horizon often rush to finalize transactions 
before the new law—and less favorable tax treatment—takes effect.225 Such 
 
 221 In some sense, the use of an independent agency to decide these questions allows for 
retroactive effect without what Jacob Gersen and Eric Posner describe as the downsides of “Delay 
Rules,” where retroactive legislation is too easily accomplished. Gersen and Posner explain that 
Delay Rules offer the benefit of allowing one session of the legislature to enact general legislation 
while deferring, and delegating to future legislators, specific actions. See Gersen & Posner, supra 
note 1, at 548. Gersen and Posner explain: 
Delay Rules facilitate monitoring of agents by the public and reduce the relative 
influence of interest groups over legislation. Delay allows slow and diffuse public 
attention to mobilize, reducing the advantage of well-organized groups in the legislative 
process. However, public attention is often short-lived. Once public attention wanes, 
private interests can lobby again . . . . Retroactivity, therefore, allows actors to evade 
some timing rules. The bias against retroactivity may support the democracy-enhancing 
facets of Delay Rules on the legislative process. 
Id. at 583 (citations omitted). Reliance upon independent agencies that are less subject to 
lobbying may allow for greater flexibility in having the government act retroactively without the 
attendant loss of benefits from Delay Rules that Gersen and Posner identify. 
 222 See supra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing base closures). For discussion of the 
effective use of ad hoc commissions to address politically challenging issues—including base 
closures—see Bradford C. Mank, Protecting the Environment for Future Generations: A 
Proposal for a “Republican” Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 444, 489 (1996). 
 223 See supra notes 152–158 and accompanying text (discussing transition issues that 
transcend subject matter areas). 
 224 Cf. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 16 (noting, with 
respect to creation of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, that “the subject matter of the 
new court will be sufficiently mixed to prevent any special interest from dominating it”). 
 225 For discussion and criticism of this approach, see Logue, supra note 7, at 1176–80. 
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“under-the-wire” investments are inefficient. Kyle Logue has explained 
that an ideal transition policy would decrease the incentive for such 
investments: 
With an ideal transition policy, under-the-wire investments (those 
investments that would not have occurred but for the imminent repeal of 
the incentive subsidy) would not receive grandfather treatment. At the 
same time, however, grandfather treatment should be given to whatever 
investments were made in reliance on the incentive subsidy’s existence, 
so long as that investment was made prior to the repeal of the subsidy. 
One possibility would be for Congress to try to sort out these two types 
of investments and grandfather the latter but not the former. To do so 
with perfect accuracy, however, would be impossible.226  
While Logue may be correct that it would be (at least nearly) impossible 
for Congress to distinguish between these two types of investments, it is far 
more plausible that Congress could delegate such responsibility to an 
independent agency, which could then resolve each such claim on a case-
by-case basis pursuant to a substantial body of expertise and experience.227 
To be sure, dividing authority among more than one actor entails 
coordination costs and potential delays.228 Yet we believe that the attendant 
benefits outweigh those costs. The varying competencies of different actors 
are important enough to the attainment of optimal legal transition relief that 
the substitution of a less capable institutional actor would seriously impair 
the final regulatory product. 
Ultimately, we are not confident that any government actor—be it 
legislative or executive—will succeed in fending off rent-seeking by 
powerful interests related to transition relief. The institutional safeguards 
that we outline in this Part would help to ameliorate the problem. 
Implementing these institutional correctives, however, would require 
fundamental shifts in power, and it remains unclear whether Congress has 
the proper incentives to divest itself of authority in this fashion. Hopeful 
signs exist but are far too scattered to form any basis for generalization. 
The first-best world remains elusive. 
 
 
 226 Id. at 1179–80. Accepting this impossibility, Logue goes on to propose that new tax laws 
should be applied prospectively, not from the date of enactment but from the date that they are 
originally proposed in Congress. Id. at 1180. 
 227 Cf. Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1615–18, 1623–26 
(1995) (citing examples of alternative dispute resolution to allocate limited Dalkon Shield– and 
asbestos-related injuries, and advocating greater use of such systems in mass tort litigation). 
 228 Cf. William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory 
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 17–36 (highlighting that assumption of single government regulator is 
incorrect and noting that multiplicity of potential regulators may impose costs). 
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CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have endeavored to fill major gaps in the existing 
literature on legal transition relief. We have argued that the major 
impediment to a private market for insurance against legal transitions is 
pricing. We have also attempted to demonstrate that, while information and 
derivative markets conceivably might help to solve pricing problems, such 
markets are unlikely to become robust enough to function properly. Finally, 
our analysis of the institutional options available within government 
compels the conclusion that independent agencies should play larger roles 
in distributing transition relief. The institutional options available within 
government are not ideal, but neither have they yet been fully utilized. 
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